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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this
case under U.C.A. 78-2-2 (3)j and transferred it to the Utah Court
of Appeals under its pour over authority granted in U.C.A. 78-22(4).

This Court has

jurisdiction of the above captioned case

pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2) (k) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1
1. Did the lower court erroneously grant summary judgment based
on its rulings that:
A.

Appellee Norton, as a ''component part" manufacturer,

owed no duty to the plaintiff?
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 44,
1. 1-6)
B.

No factual issues existed as to Norton's percentage of

fault under U.C.A. 76-27-37 et

seq. under plaintiff's theories

of negligence, product liability and breach of warranty?
Raised below: Summary Judgment order (p. 4, paragraph 6)

^•White v. Deseelhorst,
879 P. 2d 1371 (Utah 1994) and Madsen v.
Borthick,
769 P. 2d 245 (Utah 1988) set out the standard for review of
a grant of summary judgment. They state there must be no disputed
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. No deference is given to the lower court's legal
conclusion but they are reviewed for correctness.
1

C.

Norton, as a 'component part' manufacturer, could not

foresee how its pail would be used?
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 43,
1. 18-25; p. 44, 1. 9)
D.

Norton's pail was not defective when it left the

manufacturer?
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 44,
1. 8-12)
E.

There were no material issues of fact in dispute?

Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 44,
1. 13-17)
2. Did the lower court error in its ruling that Appellee Norton's
motion for summary judgment, unresisted by plaintiff, and under
the circumstances in the present case, meets the

Sullivan

requirement of being "dismissed due to a lack of fault as a
matter of law"2, and thus the jury could not determine Appellee
Norton's proportionate fault?3

2

Sullivan

v.

Scoular

Grain

Co. Of Utah,

853 P. 2d 877, 884 (Utah

1993)
3

The standard of review for legal conclusions is the Madsen case,
supra.
2

Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 10,
1. 18-20)
3.

Appellee Norton, in a motion for summary disposition, raised

the issue of Appellant NSI's standing to resist its motion for
summary judgment. The standing issues include:4
A.

Does a co-defendant have right, or a duty, to resist the

motion for summary judgment by a co-defendant against the
plaintiff?
B.

Does a co-defendant have standing to appeal the granting

of a summary judgment motion between the plaintiff and a codefendant?
C.

Did appellee Norton properly raise these issues on

appeal?
4. Does a co-defendant have a duty to resist a motion for summary
judgment between a co-defendant and the plaintiff, or pay that
co-defendant's proportionate share of fault, and if so, should
the lower court have granted NSI's request for additional time to
respond to co-defendant Norton's motion?3

4

The standing issues were raised for the first time by Norton in
a motion for summary disposition before the Utah Supreme Court. The
motion was denied. See footnote 3, page 2.
3

Raised below: Summary Judgment motion transcript (R p. 10,
1. 7-8)
All issues were decided as a matter of law by the lower
court, and this court reviews them for correctness, without
deference to the lower courts decision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
1.

This is a personal injury case.

Plaintiff's eye was

severely lacerated while opening the pour spout of a seven gallon
metal pail of Hi-Foam Degreaser, a type of soap.
2.

The seal which struck plaintiff in the eye was

manufactured by International Machine and Tool Works, Inc., who
was named in the suit, but never served by plaintiff.
Defendant/appellee Norton incorporated the International lid into
Norton's top to its seven gallon metal pail.

Norton sold the

complete pail to appellant NSI, who filled the pail with soap,
without any alteration of the lid or seal, placed the lid on the
pail, and sold the pail and soap to plaintiff. Plaintiff sued
based on product liability, negligence and breach of warranty.
3.

The accident occurred as follows.

the cap on the pour spout.

Plaintiff unscrewed

Underneath was a metal seal with the

instruction "Pry Out" (the "Pry Out" instruction was imprinted by

4

International, and sold by Norton with its container.)

As

plaintiff pried the seal, it suddenly exploded outward, hitting
him in the eye.

Despite several operations, plaintiff is

functionally blind in the eye.
4.

The reason for the can being pressurized is relevant to

this appeal, and those facts are cited below.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

Appellee Norton moved for summary judgment against the

plaintiff.

Plaintiff obtained an extension of time to respond (R

p. 15, 1. 15-19) and told counsel for appellant NSI that he would
respond (R pp. 15-16, 1. 25-2).
2.

Appellant NSI had not anticipated responding to Norton's

motion for summary judgment.

When plaintiff's counsel told

counsel for NSI that plaintiff was not going to file a response,
plaintiff's counsel said "whereupon, [counsel for NSI] had a
small fit, and said he was going to file one.
ahead.

I said fine, go

So, in fairness to [counsel for NSI] he did not know that

[plaintiff] was not going to file a response,...until after
[plaintiff's] response time was finished."
2).
days.

(R pp. 15-16, 1. 24-

Counsel for appellant NSI responded within several working
(R p. 9, 1. 22-24) .

5

3.

At the summary judgment hearing appellee Norton argued

that NSI's response was weeks late (since NSI did not request an
extension, only the plaintiff did) (R p. 14, 1. 19-25).

Appellee

Norton argued co-defendant NSI's response should be ignored,
leaving the court no alternative except to grant Norton's
unresisted motion.

(Norton's reply memorandum, p. 2; see

also

R

p.24, 1. 7-14) .
4.

NSI argued that it had no obligation to resist a co-

defendant's motion, and in fact, did not resist it as long as
Norton's fault would be determined by the jury.

(R p. 10, 1. 1-

2; p. 12, 1. 1-5).
5.

NSI requested more time to build a case against Norton

and respond to the summary judgment if the court held that NSI
had an obligation to step into plaintiff's shoes and prove the
plaintiff's case against Norton, or risk having the jury not
determine Norton's fault.

(R pp. 11-12, 1. 11-5; p. 23, 1. 6-

11) .
6.

Plaintiff's counsel maintained he was not obligated to

file a response but that the Court "...has an obligation, under
the rules, to decide the motion on the merits."

(R p. 20, 1. 18-

24) . An "on the merits" ruling would prevent Norton from having
its fault proportionately determined by the jury.
6

7.

With this unusual procedural position before it, the

Court gave an "advisory opinion" and stated the Court was
"...inclined to disregard the opposition to Norton's Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by National Service Industry.
reason being that it was not timely filed....

And the

Therefore, the

status of the record is that there is a Motion for Summary
Judgment by the defendant Norton.
responded.

The plaintiff has not

And the Court is inclined to find that, based on the

merits of the motion, that Norton is entitled to summary
judgment."
8.

(R p. 24, 1. 7-14)

NSI pointed out that the Court's advisory ruling would

work a great injustice to ignore the merits of the motion yet
grant the motion "on the merits."
for Norton's portion of fault.

It would result in NSI paying

NSI also pointed out that co-

defendants seldom file responses to a co-defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and that NSI had relied on plaintiff's
counsel's representation that he would file a memorandum
resisting the motion.
9.

(R pp. 24-25, 1. 17-5)

Plaintiff's counsel agreed it would be unfair to ignore

NSI's brief, since he had made the representation he would file
an opposition to the motion, and plaintiff's counsel urged the

7

court to consider the motion on the merits.
10.

(R pp. 15-16, 1. 22-2)

With this procedural scenario before him, the court

reversed the advisory ruling and agreed to hear the motion on
"...the merits, or lack thereof."
11.

(R p. 29, 1. 13-18)

The lower court heard argument on the merits of

Norton's motion for summary judgment and granted it.

The lower

court ruled that Norton's fault would not be determined by the
jury.

The Court ruled that Norton owed no duty to warn plaintiff

and that the product was not defective as a matter of law.
(Court's Summary Judgment, addendum 1)
12.

NSI and plaintiff negotiated a settlement and release

which compensated plaintiff for all of his damages, and plaintiff
agreed to assign claims and assist NSI in seeking to have
Norton's fault determined.
against NSI.

Plaintiff dismissed his claims

The lower court's summary judgment against

plaintiff, thus became final and was appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The seal which injured plaintiff's eye, with the

instruction "Pry Out" imprinted on it, was made by International.
Norton purchased the seal and lid component from International
and incorporated the seal into the top of Norton's pail.
Norton depo. p. 50, 1. 16-22: page 19, lines 5-13)
8

(Howard

2.

NSI received the container top, including the seal, as

one unit, preassembled by Norton.

(Howard Norton Depo. p. 19, 1.

8-13).
3.

Plaintiff followed Norton's imprinted instructions by

prying the seal off with his pocket knife.

Plaintiff describes

his accident:
I read the instructions [NSI's] to see how much product I
was going to need, and to see how to use the product. And
at that point, I attempted to remove the lid so that I could
pour out the amount of product that I needed to use to clean
the engine off with. I unscrewed the cap.
After, you
know, unscrewing the cap, it had the safety seal, which was
a little metal ring and embossed in it was the words, u Pry
out," [International/Norton's instruction] with an arrow
pointing down. At that point, I took my pocketknife out of
my pocket, pried where it said to pry, heard an explosion,
felt something instantaneously contact my eye, and felt
pain.
(Plaintiff's depo. pp. 35-36, 1. 16-1)
4.

There was also a printed label of instructions attached

to the container by NSI.

The NSI label gave instructions on how

to use the product itself.
5. Norton holds itself out as a "leading supplier of
shipping containers for the Western United States"; that their
"...pails are manufactured to meet the standards of the
Department of Transportation" and that "Norton Manufacturing is a
major supplier for many industries including paint, petroleum,

9

chemical, food, roofing, ag chem adhesives and ink."

(Howard

Norton depo. Exhibit 1) The pail is normally used to ship
liquids.
6.

(Norton depo. p. 33, 1. 15-19)
Mr. Norton knew of nothing that indicated the plaintiff

did anything improper in removing the lid.

(Howard Norton

deposition page 51-52, lines 24-2)
7.

The seal's purpose is a "tamper proof seal."

(Deposition of Norton employee Gerald Bettridge, p. 30, 1. 12)
8.

NSI filled the pail with soap, without any alteration of

the seal, and crimped the top onto the pail.
pail and its ingredients to plaintiff.
9.

NSI then sold the

(R p. 3, 1. 18-19)

Dr. Noel de Nevers, a professor of chemical engineering

at the University of Utah Engineering Department, testified that
the accident "...was caused by the inner seal piece being driven
by gas pressure into the eye of the plaintiff" (de Nevers depo.,
p. 8, lines 14-20) .
10.

Dr. de Nevers thought that the pressure may have been

created by chemical reactions in the NSI product, or perhaps by
formation of Peroxides.

Dr. de Nevers ran gas chromatograph and

mass spectoptometry tests, and consulted with other experts.
concluded:

10

He

Q. And the other possibility is some chemical reaction, but
you've fairly well ruled that out.
A. I can find no evidence to support it.
guarantee that it did not occur.
Q.

But in your opinion, it did not occur?

A.

I believe it did not occur,

(de Nevers Depo. p.
pp. 52-53, 1.
11.

That doesn't

57, 1.13-18; see, also, p.

9-9; p.

54, 1.

17-25; p.

28, 1.

57, 1.

4-13;

13-18)

Dr. Fineman, NSI's chemist, testified that the

ingredients in NSI's soap cannot cause a pressure buildup.

u

...as a chemist, I have to respond by telling you that there's no
basis whatever for any pressure buildup in this product."
(Fineman depo. pp. 32-33, 1. 23-4; p. 36, 1. 7-22)
12.

Dr. de Nevers eliminated any chemical reaction of the

contents of the container as the cause of the accident.

Rather

than the contents causing pressure, plaintiff's expert testified
that plaintiff's accident occurred because of pressurization due
to:
(a) Change in altitude.
level.

The product was packaged at sea

When opened in Utah's higher altitude, the atmospheric

pressure was less, making the container "pressurized" in relation
to the outside air, independent of the container's contents; and

11

(b) the product was packaged at a slightly lower temperature
than the temperature when opened.

Higher temperatures can create

higher pressure inside the can. Dr. de Nevers was uncertain about
the affect of temperature on the NSI can.
Other similar facts are quoted or cited to in the arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. NORTON HAD A DUTY.
The lower court erred when it held Norton owed no duty to
provide a safe product or warn of its product's danger.

Anyone

who sells a defective product is subject to liability for
injuries caused by that defective product.

The law clearly

imposes upon manufacturers of goods, and even component parts, a
duty to provide non-defective goods and/or a duty to warn of the
products danger.

Norton had a duty to provide a safe container

that would release altitude change pressure in a safe manner.
B.

NORTON'S PRODUCT WAS A CONTAINER.
The court was mistaken in holding that Norton was only a

component part manufacturer rather than a manufacturer of
containers.

It was not only foreseeable by Norton but intended

by Norton that their product be used as a container to hold
liquids.

This differentiates them from a component part

manufacturer who cannot reasonably foresee how its component or
12

raw material will be used.

Norton therefore had a duty to

provide a safe product and/or to warn of the dangers of this
product when used in its foreseeable and intended use. Regardless
of this argument, under either theory, Norton had a duty to
provide a non-defective good and the lower court improperly ruled
that it had no duty.
C.

NORTON FAILED TO WARN OF THE CONTAINERS DANGER.
Norton put instructions on the container as to how to open

it.

Norton knew of the danger of pressure build up from an

altitude change yet failed to include in its instructions on
opening the container any warning of the potential pressure build
up or how to safely open the lid.

Norton was negligent by

failing to warn of the danger or how one could safely open the
container.
D.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THERE WAS NO MATERIAL

ISSUE OF FACT BEFORE THE COURT.
The court failed to look at factual issues before the court
in a light most favorable to NSI.

The plaintiff raised the

question of why the container was pressurized and was this
unreasonably dangerous.

The evidence before the court indicated

the pressure was created by an altitude change and would have
occurred regardless of what NSI put in the container.
13

This

question of fact could lead a jury to determine the container
rather than NSI's soap was dangerous and the cause of plaintiff's
injury.
E.

STANDING.
Norton argued NSI had no standing to oppose the motion for

summary judgment or to appeal the ruling.

Law requires an

opportunity for NSI to litigate the issue of Norton's fault.

The

Defendant/Appellee was not dismissed on an adjudication on the
merits and therefore should be included in an apportionment of
fault.

The lower court's erroneous ruling on the lack of

Norton's duty, the non-defective nature of the "component", and
that there were no material issues of fact before the court
allowed Norton to be dismissed without a fair adjudication of the
merits.

Coupled with no opposition from plaintiff's counsel, it

allowed a defendant to be improperly dismissed on the merits.
This would then expose NSI to a disproportionate share of the
fault and costs of injury since, under case law, a defendant
dismissed on the merits is not included in apportionment.

The

open courts provision, due process and fairness dictate a
dismissal is not on the merits and NSI should be allowed to prove
Norton's fault.

14

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

REVIEW OF LOWER COURTS GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

In White

v.

Deseelhorst,

879 P.2d 1371, (Utah 1994), the

Utah Supreme Court set out a clear standard for reviewing a lower
court's summary judgment. The court states:
The standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment is
well established. Summary judgment is proper when there are
no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Citations
omitted). Because summary judgment is granted as a matter
of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness.
(Citations omitted).
We also note that summary judgment is generally
inappropriate to resolve negligence claims and should be employed
"only in the most clear-cut case." (Citations omitted).
11

Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required

standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." (Citations
omitted).

"Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless

the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law,' and reasonable
minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's
negligence under the circumstances." (Citations omitted)(Emphasis
added)
The standard is clear.

This court reviews the case anew,

without deference to the lower court, to assure this drastic
remedy is not misapplied.
15

POINT II: THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT NORTON OWED NO DUTY TO
PLAINTIFF WAS ERRONEOUS.
A.

Standard of Review.
This Court's Review is without deference to the lower Court.

Whether or not a duty is owed is a matter of law for the court to
decide.

This court reviews matters of law without deference to

lower court decisions.

BeruJbe v. Fashion

Centre,

Ltd.,

Ill

P. 2d

1033, 1039 (Utah 1989).
B.

Norton Owed a Duty To Plaintiff and NSI.
The lower court order held "...Norton did not have a duty to

warn" (Summary judgment, p.4, para. l)of the dangers of the
container it manufactured.

Case law simply does not support this

conclusion of law.
Norton did not argue a lack of duty in its brief in the
lower court, but at the oral argument Norton focused on the claim
that it had no legal duty to either plaintiff or NSI, since
Norton claimed to be a * component part" manufacturer5.

s

Norton

^...getting to the bottom line on a motion for summary
judgment, Your Honor, as a matter of law, has the decision to
determine whether my client had a duty. That is a legal question.
(R. P. 8, lines 10-13). "As a matter of law, we have cited to Your
Honor cases that under this scenario we don't have a duty, as a
component part manufacturer, to the plaintiff in this case. We don't
have a duty to [NSI] since there is no contribution in this state,
your Honor'' (R. P.8-9, 1.22-1)
16

evidently relies on several cases cited in its brief in support
of its claim, and the Court's ruling, that Norton owed no duty to
plaintiff or NSI.
The first case is Sperry
1512 (E.D. Mo. 1992).

v.

Bauermeister,

In Sperry,

Inc.,

786 F.Supp.

Bauermeister designed,

manufactured, and assembled a milling system.

Micron, who was

granted summary judgment, had supplied Bauermeister with an air
lock which was incorporated by Bauermeister into its mill.
Plaintiff's expert testified that "...the defect existed in the
design of the milling system, not with any one component part."
Sperry

Id., at 1515.

It was plaintiff's expert's opinion that

the responsibility for the defect "...would be the responsibility
of the designer herein

... an interlock cannot be effectively

designed into a component part without first knowing how that
component part is going to be integrated into a system."

Sperry

Id. at 1516.
Based on this factual evidence, the Federal District Court
found that "...the Micron airlock was not defective."
Id., at 1516 (emphasis added).

Sperry

The court never found that Micron

did not owe a duty, only that Micron's component part was not
defective.

The former is a matter of law, the latter a question

17

of fact.

Sperry

not only fails to support Norton's claim of no

duty, but held there was a duty.
A second case cited by Norton is Miller
Nemours,

v.

811 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992).

E.I.

Miller

DuPont's PTFE fibers which were sold to Vitech.

DuPont

de

involved

Vitech mixed the

DuPont fibers with other ingredients and, "...using its own
patented procedures, manufactured and marketed the substance
known as Proplast."

Miller

Id., at 1287.

The Federal District

Judge again concluded "... there is no proof the PTFE was a
defective "component part" of the allegedly defective proplast
manufactured by Vitech.

Again, the Court did not rule there was

"no duty", but that the PTFE was not defective.
In Miller,

the Federal District Judge also accepted a report

by the Magistrate, which was published as an appendix to the
Court's decision.

In the appendix the Magistrate used some

language referring to FDA approval of medications and medical
implants, stating there was no duty on behalf of the component
part manufacturers to assure that the specialized medical use was
safe.

This language regarding "no duty," appearing in the

appendix, refers to medical implant and prescription drugs, under
the auspices of the FDA, which is clearly inapplicable here.
Another portion of the Magistrate's appendix is a correct
18

statement of the law

xx

... although the A[t]he manufacturer of a

component part certainly may be held liable for a defect in its
product. even after that part is assembled into a larger
product [,]

(citations omitted)..., the defect must be present in

the single 'self contained component part7 itself (citations
omitted).'" (Citations omitted.)
in its product.

Norton is liable for the defect

The seal which it sold to NSI was defective in

that it could not release pressure (even due solely to a change
in altitude(see below)) in a slow manner, but rather exploded.
Norton's container was defective in that its opening instructions
"PRY OUT" were insufficient and failed to warn the consumer of
the danger of releasing normal pressure, irrespective of the
product inside the container, in a nonexplosive manner.
Manufacturers, including Norton, owe a duty to the plaintiff
of supplying non-defective parts.

The Court's ruling that Norton

owed no duty is simply erroneous.

Utah has adopted Section 402A

of the Restatement of Torts, see Earnest
Steel

Co.,

601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).

W. Hahn,

Inc.

v.

Armco

Section 402A states

M l ) one who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused...."
Emphasis added.

Norton falls under section 4 02A as much as
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other manufacturers.

The Court's ruling that Norton owed no duty

is erroneous and must be overturned.

Whether there is a factual

question regarding Norton's breach of the duty is treated below.
POINT III:

THE COURT'S HOLDING THAT NORTON'S PAIL WAS A
"COMPONENT PART" WAS ERRONEOUS.

A.

The Court's Ruling.
The Court's summary judgment stated that "Norton shipped to

NSI the component parts consisting of the cover and the steel
pail."

Summary judgment, page 2, emphasis added.

The lower

court stated u... as a component part manufacturer supplying the
steel pail and cover...Norton did not have a duty to warn."
B.

Law of "Component Part".
The cases cited by Norton in the lower court,

component part manufacturer,

hold that a

whose product is not unreasonably

dangerous by itself or defective, is not liable if a subsequent
manufacturer designs and manufactures an unreasonably dangerous
product, using the original manufacturer's raw material or
component part.

Norton cited Sperry,

supra (an airlock

incorporated into a milling system which was designed,
manufactured and assembled by another defendant) and

Miller,

supra (DuPont fiber that was mixed with other ingredients, in a
patented process, to make biomedical implant joints).
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Contrary to the lower court's ruling, Norton's pail and lid
were not "component parts," but were completed "containers."

The

basic difference is who designed and manufactured the product and
whether its use by others was foreseeable.
manufactured the container.

Norton designed and

(R p. 3, 1. 1-14).

NSI did not

contribute to the manufacturing, but only u...fill[ed] the pail
with a variety of products, and then clamp[ed] the lid down."
p. 3, 1. 18-19).

(R

The lower court ruled the container was

"...manufactured pursuant to the specifications of NSI...", but
that is misleading.

NSI specifies a certain size of container,

type of lid, color etc, just as one might specify options on a
car.

But is Norton who makes the pail itself.

As counsel for

Norton stated at the hearing,
Norton has received directions from [NSI]. They
will call in. They will make a bulk order. They
gave my client directions in its litho process,
the color that they wanted the pail painted and
the name that they wanted to put on the pail.
[Norton] then makes the pail. They make the
cover, which is what we call the lid, the yellow
part, and they install into the cover a screw cap
and lid type material from International Machine
and Tool..."
(R p. 3, 1. 2-10)(emphasis added).
Norton's pail is not a component part, but a container.

The

addition of a liquid to the pail, which was clearly anticipated
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by Norton, cannot make the pail raw material or component part.
It was not only foreseeable to Norton that the container would be
used to hold a liquid, such as NSI's soap, but Norton
specifically intended that use.
C.

(Norton depo. Exhibit 1 ) .

Norton's Product is a ^Container."
Courts have treated containers differently than components.

Even in Utah case law, containers have been treated not as a
component part of a product, but as a separate item.
v.

Wasatch

Chemical

Company,

Palmer

In

353 P.2d 985 (Utah 1960) the court

looked at a case involving tort liability for a defective
container.

The court treated the contents, sulfuric acid, and

the two containers separately.

Other courts have done the same.

There are many cases holding container manufacturers liable, and
Norton's case is analogous to those cases, not the component part
cases.
One example of a container case is Van Duzer
Coca Cola

Bottling

Co.,

714 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1987).

v.
Van

Shoshone
Duzer

involved a Canada Dry bottle which exploded, severely injuring
plaintiff's eye.

Plaintiff sued both the container manufacturer

and the bottler.

The jury found for both defendants.

Supreme Court of Nevada reversed, as a matter of law.
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The

We are at a loss to understand how the jury could
have concluded form this evidence that the bottle
did not fail to perform in the manner to be
reasonably expected. The bottle was handled in
precisely the manner in which it was intended to
be handled... A product container that cannot
withstand the rigors of normal shopping practices
is unreasonably dangerous and, by definition,
defective.
Van Duzer,

Id., at 813.

(emphasis added)

applicable to the present case.

The same reasoning is

It could be said, as a matter of

law, that the plaintiff was opening Norton's container exactly as
Norton expected it to be opened.

Plaintiff pried out the seal

Norton instructed him to "Pry Out".

Norton knew that

pressure

normally builds up in its container, due merely to altitude and
temperature changes6.

Norton found nothing improper with the

manner in which plaintiff removed the seal.7
U

Duzer,

To paraphrase Van

A product container that cannot withstand the rigors of

6

Q: Mr. Norton, I presume you're aware that if something, even
such as a bag of potato chips, is packaged in California and brought,
for example to Utah, which is much higher in altitude, that some
pressure builds up in the packaging?
A: Yes.
Q; And that not only altitude will affect that pressure, but
temperature as well?
A: Yes. (Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24).
7

Q: Mr. Norton, anything you know of, that you read or heard,
that indicates my client did anything improper in attempting to
remove the lid?
A: No. (Norton depo. p. 52-3, 1. 24-2) .
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normal [opening] practices is unreasonably dangerous and, by
definition, defective."
In Van Duzer,

Van Duzer,

Id., at 813.

either the contents of the container or the

container itself was defective and caused the injury, as a matter
of law.

The contents by having too much pressure or the

container because it was manufactured improperly and could not
withstand the pressure that was properly in the bottle.
court therefore remanded the case for a new trial.

The

With a

component, it may not be reasonably foreseeable how it may be
used.

With a container, it is not only reasonably foreseeable

how it will be used, but the intent of the manufacturer that it
will be used as a container.

A container manufacturer has a duty

to make their product safe or to warn of the dangers.
Van Duzer,

on very similar facts, found as matter of law

that the container was defective.
exists in the present case.
cases is misleading.

Certainly a factual issue

Norton's citation of component part

This is a container case, and it was not

only foreseeable, but Norton intended that its container carry
liquid, knew it would have pressure in it, and knew it would be
opened the way it was.
The lower court's ruling that Norton was a component part
manufacturer is erroneous, and mislead the court on whether the
24

use of its product was foreseeable.

Unlike DuPont's non-

defective fibers being mixed in a patented formula to make
temporomandibular joints, Norton knew of the use NSI and
plaintiff would put its container.

Norton designed, manufactured

and instructed on how to open its container.

The design was

defective in not allowing the slow release of pressure that
Norton knew would be present.

Norton failed to warn, in its

instructions to open its container, of the danger of the pressure
it knew would be there.
D.

Failure to Warn.
A manufacturer of a product has a duty to warn if there is a

danger with its product when it knew or should have known of the
hazard or danger.
When a manufacturer or seller knows or should know
of unreasonable dangers associated with the use of
its product and the dangers are not obvious to
product users, a manufacturer has an obligation to
warn of the dangers and a breach of that
obligation constitutes negligence.
Mile

Hi Concrete,

also Halter

v.

Inc.

V. Matz,

Waco Scaffolding

842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992).
& Equipment,

(Colo.App. 1990).
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797 P.2d 790

See

Norton was responsible for the design of the container and
it decided, despite its knowledge of pressure,8 that no pressure
release device, or warning, would be a part of its product. As a
manufacturer of cans, Norton,

knew that its cans would be

distributed throughout the Western United States and subject to
varying atmospheric pressures at different altitudes.

(See

citations in footnote 6, and also Norton depo. Exhibit 1 ) . The
cost of putting a proper warning on the can or lid would be
minimal.
A duty to warn also applies to strict liability cases.
Sperry

v.

Bauermeister,

Inc.

Supra, cited by Norton, states "The

theory of strict liability is further broken down into liability
for defective design and liability for failure to warn of an
inherent danger in the product."

The instructions for use of the

contents of the can were supplied by NSI as the court noted.

But

the instructions for the opening of the container were supplied
by Norton.

Norton sells the can with the seal , which injured

plaintiff, and which had the opening instructions "Pry Out"
imprinted

the

seal, already incorporated into its container.

(Norton Depo. P. 19, L. 1-13).

Norton had a duty to warn

See Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24, quoted in footnote above.
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regarding the opening of its container,

and it failed to

properly warn.
As detailed more in the subsequent section, the pail became
pressurized because of altitude. Norton knew this pressurization
occurred.9

The soap inside did not create the pressure.

The

same accident would have happened had the pail contained any of
the other liquids for which it was designed (ink, vegetable oil,
etc.,

if it had contained water, or even if it was empty).

It

was the seal on the pail itself which created the injury, not the
contents.

It was the "Pry Out" instructions, already imprinted

when Norton sold the pail, that plaintiff was following when his
eye was injured.
The law is also clear that the original

manufacturer of a

product is liable, even though the final assembly of the product
is delegated to another company.

This is true even if the final

assembly is done incorrectly (which is not an allegation in the

present case).

Caporale

v. Raleigh

Industries

382 So.2d 849 (Fla.App. 1980).

9

See Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24.
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of America,

Inc.,

E•

Summary.
Norton designs, manufactures and sells containers, as

complete products except for placing a lid on top and sealing it.
Norton designed the containers to hold liquids.

The container in

the current case was, in and of itself, dangerous, in that it did
not have a safe way to release the pressure that Norton knew
would build up due to mere altitude changes and temperature
change.

Norton owed a duty to plaintiff and to NSI to

manufacture a safe container or warn of the danger.

The court's

rulings that Norton owed no duty, and that the pail was a
"component part" are erroneous and the case must be remanded to
have Norton's proportionate fault determined.
POINT IV: THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT THERE WAS NO MATERIAL
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO NORTON" S FAULT WAS ERRONEOUS.
A.

Standard of Review.
The complaint (Exhibit 1 to Norton's Memorandum in Support

of Motion For Summary Judgment, P 4-6) includes allegations of
both strict liability and negligence.

They are treated jointly

in this section because similar facts support both legal
theories.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously stated that

"Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required
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standard of care is a question of fact for the jury."

White,

Supra (emphasis added).
B.

Factual issues are created by Plaintiff's testimony.
Plaintiff testified that he followed the instructions of

"Pry Out" on the seal of Norton!s pail.

While prying, he heard

an explosion, like a firecracker, and was struck in the eye by
the seal ( Packer Depo. p. 35-36, 1. 13-1, quoted supra).
Plaintiff's testimony alone is sufficient to raise a question of
fact as to the defect of Norton's container and Norton's
negligence.

The container was pressurized, and the resulting

injury shows it was obviously dangerous.

Norton acknowledges

that altitude and temperature differences will pressurize its
containers.

(Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24 quoted supra).

expert testimony is even needed.

No

Jurors can decide whether

containers that the manufacturer acknowledges will become
pressurized in their normal use are unreasonably dangerous in the
expectations of the consumer.

No expert testimony is necessary

to submit to the jury whether blinding the plaintiff is within
the reasonable expectation of a consumer.

There are sufficient

facts to submit to the jury whether the Norton container was
defective or negligently designed in not have a mechanism to
release pressure that Norton knows can be present in normal
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handling.

The same is true for whether Norton should have

warned, in addition to its "Pry Out" instruction, about the
danger of the pressure due to altitude and temperature
variations. In the Van Duzen,

supra, the court reversed a jury

finding, as a matter of law, when a container, in normal use,
partially blinded a plaintiff.

Certainly a factual issue is

raised here.
C.

Expert Testimony Creates Factual Issues•
In addition to plaintiff's testimony, plaintiff hired Dr.

Noel de Nevers, Professor in the Department of Chemical
Engineering

at the University of Utah.

Dr. de Nevers did

extensive testing in order to determine what created the
pressure in the can plaintiff opened.

Dr. de Nevers testing took

place on a second container, also manufactured by Norton, which
was filled with soap by NSI out of the same batch, on the same
day, as the container which injured plaintiff.

This container

was given to plaintiff by a friend, who purchased it at the same
time.
This similar container was found to be pressurized at 5.5
PSI by Dr. de Nevers.

Based on his testing, Dr. de Nevers

testified that plaintiff's eye injury "was caused by the inner
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seal piece being driven by gas pressure into the eye of the
plaintiff".

(De Nevers depo. p. 8,

lines 14-20)

Dr. de Nevers addressed three possible sources of the gas:
1)

a chemical reaction involving the soap itself; 2) an increase

in altitude; and 3) an increase in temperature.
1.

The soap did not create the pressure in the container.

Dr. de Nevers extracted the pressurized gas from inside the
similar container into a sterile vacuum.

The gas that

pressurized the pail was tested by Dr. de Nevers to determine its
source.

The tests included gas chromatograph and mass

spectrometry analyzation of the containers gas.

Dr. de Nevers

anticipated the gas had been formed by a chemical reaction of
some sort involving the contents of the container.
compressed gas was indistinguishable from air.1

Instead, the

The possibility

of the contents of the container creating a chemical reaction was
thoroughly tested by Dr. de Nevers and excluded2.

Dr. Fineman

1

(Dr. de Nevers depo., pp.20-21, lines 15-16; pp 22-23,
lines 24-3; p 63, lines 11-19)
The nitrogen-oxygen ratio was
virtually the same as air, and there were no other components in the
sample that were not found in the same approximate quantities as air.
(De Nevers depo., p 21, line 3-12; p 63, lines 11-19).

2

Dr. de Nevers tested for peroxides, which can decompose
violently, ''...eventually concluding that there was no evidence to
support that conclusion", (Depo. p. 28 1. 6-13) and "...they were not
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of NSI,

testified the same, "... as a chemist, I have to respond

by telling you that there's no basis whatever for any pressure
build up in this product."
2.

(Fineman depo, P. 33, L. 2-4.)

The altitude change "certainly" pressurized Norton's

Container.
Dr. de Nevers calculated the pressure and speed of the seal
that would occur simply by transporting the container from sea
level to Salt Lake City.

"Well, one thing we know for certain is

that when such a container is brought from sea level to Salt Lake
City, the external atmospheric pressure changes from 14.7 to 12.5
psi."

(de Nevers depo. p. 38, lines 18-22.)

That pressure

differential amounts to "2.2 pounds per square inch." De Nevers
depo. p. 39, lines 3-5.

Dr. de Nevers calculated, based on two

different sets of assumptions, the velocity the exploding seal
based on the 2.2 psi.

The maximum velocity, using non-

conservative assumptions, "leads to a velocity of 234 feet per
second" de Nevers depo. p. 39, lines 6-17.
speed of almost 160 miles per hour.

Using conservative

a cause of this accident".
(Depo P.
considered a chemical reaction of the
that that was extremely unlikely",
"...find no evidence to support it",
occur."
(Depo. P. 57, L.13-18).
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That results in a

52, L. 15-22). Dr. de Nevers
NSI product and "...concluded
(Depo P. 54, L.17-25), could
and "...believe[s] it did not

assumptions, the seal would be blown off at about 4 0 feet per
second (De Nevers depo. p. 41, lines 14-2) or 27 miles per hour.
Norton ships its containers all over the Western United States.
Norton was aware that altitude pressurized its cans (See Norton
depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24).

Certainly, a factual question exists as

to whether Norton's container was defective in not releasing
pressure slowly upon opening and for failure to warn of this
recognized problem.

Whether altitude propels the seal at 27

miles per hour or 160 miles per hour or, likely somewhere in
between, it is unreasonable and dangerous.
3.

Pressure unlikely by change in temperature.

The third cause which Dr. de Nevers hypothecated was an
increase of pressure caused by higher temperature.

Dr. de Nevers

found an approximate 11 degree difference in temperature between
when the pail was sealed and when it was opened.1

But Dr. de

Nevers was not sure if such a small temperature rise would create
pressure.2
1

(De Nevers depo. p. 42-43, lines 23-19) Based on the average
temperature of 66 degrees in California when it was filled and 75
degrees in Salt Lake City when it was opened.
2

"The effort I made to try and find the relationship between
solubility and temperature was an effort.
To answer your last
question, I was unable to get an answer that I consider satisfactory.
If we go to trial, I will obviously have to work more on that" de
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The only clear evidence regarding temperature related
pressure is from Dr. Fineman.
create any.

He testified that it does not

"...as a chemist, I have to respond by telling you

that there is no basis what ever for any pressure build up in
this product."

(Fineman depo. p. 33, 1. 2-4; see, also, p. 36,

1. 7-22 and p. 53, 1.16-23) The state of the evidence is,
temperature had little, if any affect on the container's
pressure.
4•

Summary.

The only evidence of how the pressure was created to expel
the lid into plaintiff's eye, is the difference in altitude.

In

fact, that is a basic principle of science which is undisputed
and which Norton acknowledges.

The contents of the container did

not react to or cause any increase in pressure in the pail.

The

container would have been pressurized if NSI had put any other
liquid in it, or if Norton had sold the can to one of many other
companies who may have placed ink, water, vegetable oil or a host
of other liquids for which the can was designed.

There is at

least a factual question of the container being defective or
negligently designed, and of Norton failing to warn.

Nevers depo. p. 53-54, lines 22-1.
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The expert testimony shows Norton's container as the
defective product, and at minimum creates a factual issue.

It

was normal use of the container, not the contents, which
pressurized the container.

Norton knew this occurred but took no

steps to release the pressure slowly or warn of the danger.
Certainly, this is a disputed material fact.
D.

Marshaling the Evidence.
The only two experts in the case, indicate that the contents

of the container could not build up pressure.

Norton itself

acknowledges that altitude differences and temperature increases
will create pressure in its cans.
judgment was possibly granted.

One might wonder how summary

Norton did advance arguments and

facts and those will be treated here.
It should be noted, that there is no requirement that NSI
"marshal the evidence", as is necessary when a jury verdict is
appealed.

Since the lower court granted summary judgment, NSI

need only show that, somewhere in the case, there is enough
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact.

NSI marshals the

evidence, because it believes that it has not only a genuine
issue of fact, but a compelling case.
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1. No Duty.
First, Norton's main argument at the hearing, was that as a
"component part" manufacturer, it owed no duty.
was treated above.

This argument

Of course, if you owe no duty, the facts

showing that your product injured someone are irrelevant.

As

outlined above, the Court's ruling that Norton owed no duty was
erroneous.

The record, however, is replete with allegations and

conclusions that Norton owed no duty in the present case.

(See,

e.g. R p. 44, 1. 4-6; R p. 38, 1. 19-23; R p. 8, 1. 10-13; R pp.
8-9,

1. 22-6; R p. 14, 1. 5-7)
2.

Misleading facts.

Second, Norton uses facts, which although basically true,
are misleading.

The Court ruled that "Norton was never advised

by NSI that the steel pail and components shipped to NSI would
contain products creating vapor pressure in the head space...."
(Summary Judgment p. 3.)

{See also R p. 41, 1. 19; p. 39, 1. 17;

p. 40, 1. 7-13; p. 5, 1. 12-13; R p . 6, 1. 9-12).

These

statements are basically accurate - NSI did not inform Norton
that the product would create "vapor pressure," nor that NSI
needed a "pressure container" because, in fact, "...there is no
basis whatsoever for any pressure buildup in this product."
Fineman depo. p. 33, 1. 3-4)

(Dr.

Norton's quotes from depositions
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that NSI did not inform Norton that the NSI product would create
vapor pressure is

misleading, and not the basis of summary

j udgment.
3.

The Unusual Procedural Status of the Case,

Norton made much ado that Dr. de Nevers had never uttered
the word "defective" in his deposition. He opined, as outlined
above, that the Norton seal damaged plaintiff's eye, and was
propelled there by pressure.

Dr. de Nevers was certain that some

of the pressure came from a mere increase of altitude.

Norton

admitted that it was aware that altitude and temperature would
pressurize its containers.

Yet Norton never warned of these

dangers, Norton never provided a way to release the pressure
slowly upon opening its containers.

That is certainly enough to

raise a question of fact as to whether the container is
defective.
"defective."

But no one asked Dr. de Nevers if the container was
NSI, not having access to plaintiff's expert, was

unable to file an affidavit, as is usually done, succinctly
summarizing the necessary testimony to combat a motion for
summary judgment.

While it is easy to focus on the absence of

the word "defective," it is the whole testimony that is
important, not presence or absence of one touchstone.
Norton pointed out that Dr. Fineman of NSI testified that
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NSI continued to use the same type of pail, and that he did not
see anything wrong with the steel pail.
1-7).

(Fineman depo. p. 82, 1.

Norton argued that since Dr. Fineman did not state the

Norton container was defective, that there was no issue of fact
as to it being defective.

Again, plaintiff's failure to respond

to the motion for summary judgment created some conclusory
arguments for Norton to use, but they are without substance.
Naturally, Fineman did not render the opinion that the
container, which his company sold, was defective and unreasonably
dangerous.

NSI's primary contention against plaintiff was that

plaintiff stabbed himself in the eye with his knife while
attempting to open the container.

But plaintiff espoused a

different theory that the jury may very well believe.

Dr.

Fineman's primary opinion does not hide the genuine issues of
fact.

He also testified that "... as a chemist... there is no

basis what ever for any pressure buildup in [NSI's} product."
(Fineman depo. P. 33, 1. 2-4). Since Norton's container builds
up pressure, no matter what the product inside, Norton must warn
and design an opening that releases the pressure slowly.
factual issue clearly exists.
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A

4.

™ Component Part" Law Does Not Hide the Issues of Fact.

Last, Norton exposed the "component part" theory.

The Court

ruled, at Norton's request, that
NSI would package their own product in the pail,
close the container, apply a warning label
authored by NSI to the container and would ship
the product to an NSI customer without consulting
with Norton at any step in the process.
Summary Judgment, p. 3, paragraph 1, see

also paragraphs 2-3.

While it is true that NSI packaged its product in Norton's
container, closed the container, and put a label identifying the
contents, and describing its use (including warnings about
potential dangers of using the contents) none of those facts
warrant summary judgment for Norton.

Norton not only

anticipated, but intended that its container be so used.
of component parts and containers is outlined above.

The law

Even if it

were a component part case, NSI's filling Norton's container and
selling it is, at most, a factual issue for the jury to decide
whether NSI should have done more to warn or explain the opening
of the container.

However, this case is clearly a container

case, and Norton must design and warn for its anticipated use as
a container, including Norton's admitted knowledge of pressure
build up due to altitude and pressure changes.
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Last, the procedural posture of the case, where the
plaintiff did not resist the motion, certainly affected the
outcome.

Although plaintiff's counsel indicated that he did not

respond because he thought Norton's motion had merit (R p. 20, 1.
8-10; p. 21, 1. 12-13) he also frankly acknowledged that the
procedural posture did not hurt him.
to me.

"Frankly, it doesn't matter

It literally doesn't matter to me.

file a response....

That's why I didn't

It literally doesn't make any difference to

me if it is both of these defendants at trial or one."
1. 10-15)

U

(R p. 21,

I could have made an opposition, and maybe the

outcome will be different.
going to be."

I don't know what the outcome is

(R p. 20, 1. 4-6).

Summary judgment is a harsh procedure, used only in the most
clear cut cases.
duty to warn.

The lower court incorrectly ruled Norton had no

Factual issues abound as to Norton's liability.

This simply is not a clear cut case where Norton is entitled to
summary judgment.

The Court erred and the summary judgment

ruling should be reversed.
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A,

Did the lower court err in ruling that Norton's fault could

not be determined by the jury?
NSI did not object to Norton's summary judgment, as long as
Norton's fault was determined by the jury.

Sullivan

holds that a

defendant who is dismissed "pursuant to an adjudication on the
merits, may not be included in the apportionment" of fault.
Sullivan

at 884.

The issue here is whether a dismissal that has

been obtained through lack of good faith opposition by the
plaintiff

is "an adjudication on the merits" as that phrase is

used in Sullivan.

It would be a denial of due process (United

States Constitution, 5th Amendment; Utah Constitution, Article 1
§7) and open courts (Utah Constitution, Article 1 §11) to so
hold.

Norton, if at fault, must have its fault determined at

some point in the litigation process or NSI must pay for Norton's
share of fault.

This is the opposite result intended by

Sullivan.
Sullivan's

basic reasoning is sound.

When there is a "lack

of fault" as a matter of law, the dismissed party's exclusion
from apportionment fault does not "subject the remaining
defendants to liability in excess of their proportionate fault".
Id. at 884.

However, there is a distinction between "lack of
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fault as a matter of law" and ''adjudication on the merits."

For

example, a dismissal of a party, for the plaintiff's failure to
prosecute, may act as an "adjudication upon the merits" as to the
plaintiff . See U.R.C.P. Rule 41(b).

It is not, however, a lack

of fault as a matter of law as to the defendant.

A plaintiff

cannot fail to prosecute one defendant and thereby force another
defendant to pay the dismissed defendant's proportionate share.
Under the circumstances of this case, the lower court,
because plaintiff did not resist the motion, and particularly in
light of the fact that a factual question existed as to Norton's
fault, if it granted Norton's summary judgment, should have
allowed the jury to apportion Norton's fault.

This is so because

the summary judgment should have been granted because of a lack
of resistance, not a lack of fault as a matter of law.
It is true that the motion was resisted by the defendant.
However, the defendant did so out of an abundance of caution.

It

did so, also, on only a few days preparation, since the plaintiff
had intended on filing a brief, and even obtained an extension
for filing, before deciding not to file at the last moment.
Twice, NSI requested additional time from the Court.

NSI's

position was and still is that it had no obligation to resist the
motion and that because the plaintiff made no good faith
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opposition to the motion, the judgment was not because of "lack
of fault" and Norton should still have its fault determined.

The

court declined to take that action.
At a minimum, the open courts provision, due process, and
equal protection require that NSI be given a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate the issues of Norton's proportionate
fault, including indemnity owed by Norton as an upstream
manufacturer.

That was not afforded in the court below because

(1) the lack of opportunity as a procedural matter;
(2) the Court's several erroneous rulings including
(a) that Norton owed no duty to plaintiff
(b) categorizing Norton as a component part
manufacturer rather than a container manufacturer
(3) ruling there was no material issue of fact as to whether
Norton's product was defective or negligently designed.
(4) The procedural concerns that plaintiff's expert was not
available to summarize the issues, and hiring a expert by NSI to
prove the case against Norton was untenable also, since it would
amount to admission of selling a dangerous product by NSI.
As the Supreme Court noted in Sullivan,

allowing one party

to pay more than their proportionate share of fault is u one of
the major evils of joint and several liability"
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Sullivan

supra

at 880.

The holding in Sullivan

was premised on the express

finding that this would not occur. Sullivan,

supra, held

...that D and RG, which was dismissed pursuant to
an adjudication on the merits, may not be included
in apportionment. D and RG was dismissed due to a
lack of fault as a matter of law. Thus D and RG's
exclusion will not subject remaining defendants to
potential liability for damages in excess of their
proportionate fault.
Sullivan

supra at 884.

against in Sullivan

However, the onerous result warned

is exactly what will happen in this case if

this court allows the lower court's ruling to stand.
It should be noted that

not only has this inequity

occurred in the present case, but there is an incentive for it to
occur often in the future.

The plaintiff in the present case

declined to oppose Norton's motion.

And why should plaintiff's

counsel oppose a motion, as long as the jury cannot attribute
fault to the dismissed party.

The plaintiff's counsel in this

case stated at the hearing "...it literally doesn't make any
difference to me if it is both these defendants at trial or one."
(R p. 21, 1. 13-50) .
Often times it is in a plaintiff's interest to have only one
defendant at trial.

Multiple defendants mean multiple cross-

examinations, multiple opening arguments, multiple closing
arguments, multiple resources, etc.
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Sometimes several

defendants, each of whose fault contributed to the plaintiff's
injury, don't stand on equal ground.

Perhaps one defendant has

strong witnesses, a deep pocket, aggressive counsel, etc.
the trial judge's interpretation of Sullivan,

Under,

plaintiff's council

can build a case against the weakest defendant, stand by idly
while the other defendants move for summary judgment, and force
the remaining defendant to pay the dismissed defendant's
proportionate share of the verdict, citing the Sullivan

case.

Obviously, due process, the open courts clause, and
fairness require that the defendants, at some point in the
litigation process, have the right and standing to have the
proportionate fault of the co-defendant determined, if the
plaintiff refuses to pursue the claim (as has occurred here) or
pursues the claim haphazardly.
B.

Use of Sullivan

and issue preclusion to afford "full and fair

opportunity" to litigate.
Somewhere, all defendants are entitled to a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate their claims.
can occur in several ways.

In the present case this

First, the lower court should have

ruled that Norton's fault be determined by the jury.

Plaintiff's

failure to make a good faith response to a defendant's motion for
summary judgment is not a "determination of lack of fault as a
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matter of law," even through it acts as an adjudication on the
merits.

Sullivan

anticipates this distinction.

Second, if no "full and fair opportunity" occurs, such as
where the lower court erroneously declines to have a defendant's
fault determined (as here), the offended party can file separate
suit.

This is anticipated by rules developed regarding issue

preclusion
It is well settled that in an action between a plaintiff and
a defendant, a final judgment on the merits is binding on that
plaintiff and defendant. IB Moore's Federal Practice 2nd 0.411 [2]
1994.

The concept of

issue preclusion becomes somewhat more

obscure when more than one defendant enters the picture.

The

issue then becomes, to what extent and under what circumstances
is a defendant bound by a judgment against a

co-defendant.

Generally, the courts hold that the co-defendant is bound only
when there has been a "full and fair adjudication."
The extent to which relitigation of issues decided between
co-parties and their common adversary is precluded by
collateral estoppel in a later suit between the co-parties
is a question to which there has been no uniform answer. So
long as it was generally assumed that collateral estoppel
rested on a showing that the issue had once been litigated
between the same parties, it followed that to support the
claim of estoppel, it must appear not only that the party
asserting the estoppel and the person against whom it was
asserted were parties to the prior litigation, but also that
the question had been agitated between them and determined,
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or put another way, that as to the issue involved they were
not only parties to the same case, but adverse parties on
that issue.
Id.

"The reason for the rule is that one should not be bound by

a judgment except to the extent that he or someone representing
him had an opportunity to litigate the issue adjudicated with the
party who seeks to invoke the judgment against him." See also,
Dobbins

v. Barnes,

204 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1953)

Although the situation presented by this case arose under
the Liability Reform Act the principals regarding due process
still apply.

In other words, in order to be bound by a finding

that the co-defendant is not at fault, that finding

must have

occurred under circumstances where the defendants were
sufficiently adverse to each other that the defendant had an
opportunity to actually "litigate the issue adjudicated".

That

circumstance certainly cannot be said to exist in this case where
the plaintiff, by his own admission did virtually nothing to
assert the liability of the co-defendant and where, the
appellant, because of the trial courts rulings was not able to do
so.
The Liability Reform Act specifically abolished
contribution, substituting instead a right to have each
defendant's ("defendant" includes non-parties" proportionate
47

fault determined.

It is clear that this cause of action exists,

as the statute states
a person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is
a party to the litigation, may join as a
defendant, ... any person other than a person
immune from suit who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-41(1) (1994).

Thus, current

practice allows defendants to file a third-party complaint
against other entities, and have their proportionate fault
determined.

Rule 13(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

makes clear that cross claims are not compulsory.
C.

Summary of Procedural Issues.
In summary, the summary judgment should be reversed, and the

case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

With

the summary judgment reversed, the pleadings can be amended, and
the proportionate fault of Norton be determined.
As a second option, NSI should have an opportunity to fully
and fairly litigate these issues in a separate suit against
Norton to have its proportionate fault determined.

NSI has the

right to have Norton's proportionate fault determined.

If a

defendant moves for summary judgment, and the plaintiff does not
resist, co-defendant should not be obligated to step into
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plaintiff's shoes, hire experts and present a case against the
defendant likely admitting liability against itself in the
process.

If plaintiff fails to meet its burden against one

defendant, and a co-defendant declines to step forward and take
plaintiff's burden upon itself, the defendant may not have its
fault determined at the original trial.

If perchance the co-

defendant were to be found liable, co-defendant would then have
the option, if it chose, to file a separate suit, and have the
defendant's proportionate fault determined.
before the Liability Reform Act.

This was the process

Years of law have refined its

equities.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erroneously ruled on both legal duty and in
factual findings.

This Court should reverse the summary judgment

and remand to the trial court.
Dated this 29th day of March, 1995.
POWELL Sc LANG, P.C.
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ADDENDUM

COPY
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SHERMAN D. PACKER,
Case No. 920902466

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Honorable Pat B. Brian

NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC., et al.,

MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
May 16, 1994
* * *

BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

In the Packer matter, are there any

3

matters to be resolved by the Court except Norton's motion for

4

summary judgment?

5

MR. WINEGAR:

6

THE COURT:

I don't believe so, your Honor.
Let's call it, and we are ready to go.

7

Sherman D. Packer vs. National Service Industries, 920902466.

8

Counsel will state an appearance.

9
10

MR. KING:

Colin King and Alan Mortensen for the

plaintiff.

11

MR. BELNAP:

12

MR. WINEGAR:

13

THE COURT:

Paul Belnap for Norton.
And Todd Winegar for NSI.
You may proceed on the defendant Norton's

14

motion for summary judgment.

15

pleadings in support of, in opposition to, and the reply

16

memorandum, and is ready to hear argument.

17

MR. BELNAP:

The Court has read all the

With your Honor's indication that you

18

have read the pleadings, I will try to be brief on the facts.

19

Perhaps I could go over a couple of points which would bring

20

into focus the issues which we have here today.

21

What we are dealing with, Judge, is a seven-gallon

22

steel pail that is manufactured by my client.

23

show your Honor some pictures of this pail, if I could.

24

approach?

25

THE COURT:

Yes.

I would like to
May I

MR. BELNAP:

This is some photographs of the pail,

your Honor, that is made by Norton.

Norton has received

directions from Mr. Winegar's client, Zep.
They will make a bulk order.

They will call in.

They gave my client directions in

its litho process the color that they wanted the pail painted
and the name that they wanted to put on the pail.
My client then makes the pail.

They make the cover,

which is what we call the lid, the yellow part, and they
install into the cover a screw cap and lid type material from
International Machine and Tool, which is a party to this case.
This is received as an installed component from International
Machine and Tool, just like this.

It is not touched or

anything else by Norton, other than a machine takes it, places
it on the top of this yellow lid, and crimps it onto the lid.
These pails are then shipped on pallets in bulk to
Mr. Winegar's client, who then makes the decision, themselves,
as to what products they are going to put into the pail, and
employees of Mr. Winegar's client fill the pail with a variety
of products, and then clamp the lid down.
In that process, if I could approach again, your
Honor, we went down to Zep's facility in San Jose, where this
particular pail was manufactured, and at that facility they
make a variety of products.

Cleaners, degreasers, all sorts of

things are put into these pails.

And they have a shelf-type

system on the wall that has a number of different paper labels

3

1

that are put on the pail, depending on what kind of product is

2

put into it.

3

paper label, a copy of it, that was put on this pail.

4

designed, written and attached by Zep to the pail, talking

5

about the high-foam degreaser, and giving what directions they

6

felt were appropriate to the consumer in opening or in using

7

this product.

8
9

This Exhibit 3 from the Fineman deposition is the
This was

It is undisputed that my client was never approached.
No one ever talked to my client about what would be put in the

10

product —

11

that Zep chose to use in putting on the container, and the

12

directions that it would use.

13

or in the container, number one; on or the label

We have taken the depositions of the two people at

14

Zep, who are, number one, Mr. Fineman, who was their chief

15

engineer in charge of research and development, was

16

instrumental in developing the degreaser that went into this

17

container.

18

up through 1990.

19

litigation.

20

He was in that capacity from 1970 to approximately
He is now in charge of all of Zep ! s

His deposition was taken, and in his deposition he

21

was asked if he knew of any information that my client was ever

22

given that this pail needed to be a pressure vessel.

23

words, a vessel that could handle pressure gradients and

24

release any pressure and handle the containing of pressure.

25

And he indicated no.

In other

He was asked if he could see any problem

or defect with this pail.
just about a lay employee.

He indicated no.

We are not talking

This is a Ph.D. engineer from Zep ! s

own company.
He indicated on page 82 of his deposition that his
company had continued to use this same type of pail, and were
now two plus years post accident when this deposition was
taken.

His company made a decision that on some pails they

would buy from my client and other manufacturers, they would
use what f s called this inner seal, and some they wouldn't.
They made that decision.
He indicated, in response to my question, I asked
him, "Do these particular pails need to be a pressure vessel?"
"No, not that I am aware of."

He went on to state, after

discussion with counsel, where Mr. Winegar indicated that there
may be a component of temperature differential that could raise
vapor pressure, but not in a significant amount, quote, "I
presume you are talking about."
Then I asked the question, "And within those
parameters, do you believe these particular pails of the type
that Mr. King has shown you in photographs are fit for the
purpose of this chemical that you put into them?
"A.

Yes, they are."

We have taken the deposition of Spencer Graham, who
was the plant manager at the San Jose facility, and he himself
is an engineer, as I recall, has worked for Zep for a number of

5

1

years, both back in Atlanta at their headquarters and in San

2

Jose, and I asked him the question, "Who determined whether the

3

Norton container, with the high-foam degreaser, should have the

4

metal seal in the cap, or not?"

5

Zepfs headquarters in Atlanta.

And he said Atlanta, meaning

6

He confirmed that the same containers have continued

7

to be ordered, using the variety of different products in them

8

from my client.

9

"To your knowledge, did anyone at Zep ever indicate

10

to anyone from BW Norton that the materials that would be

11

placed in any of these steel pails would be such as would

12

create any vapor pressure or head space pressure?

13

"Well, of course, we didn't, because it was not a

14

problem.

15

then.

16

To my knowledge, we are getting the same pail now as

"Do you know who at Zep was involved in telling

17

Norton how they wanted the pail painted on the outside,

18

lettered and designed?

19

"A.

Well, of course, that design dates back a

20

number of years to when we moved out here, but it is pretty

21

much the same.

22

"And it is kind of a generic design so that these

23

paper labels can then be applied to the pail, depending upon

24

what is put in it?

25

"A.

That is correct."

1

Given that factual background, your Honor, this is

2

basically where we find ourselves in the case at this point in

3

time.

4

we discussed with the Court, he does not have evidence that the

5

pail manufactured by my client when it left our facility in

6

this condition as, simply, an empty pail, with no paper label

7

on it, with no knowledge on our part what was going to be put

8

into it, and we are not the one packaging it, he has no

9

evidence that in that condition the pail was in a defective

10

Mr. King has indicated that, through his expert, and as

state.

11

His expert has indicated that, in his opinion, there

12

was approximately five pounds of pressure in head space of the

13

pail, and that!s based on testing a like pail, from the exact

14

same batch.

15

up of pressure, this inner seal popped out, and hit his client

16

in the eye.

17

would indicate that the pail itself is defective.

18

And it is his opinion, that based upon that build-

But there is no opinions in his testimony which

As I have recited for you, the testimony from

19

Mr. Winegar's own witnesses indicate that they have no

20

knowledge or belief that the pail is defective.

21

consulted with us about what warnings should be on the pail, or

22

asked us if the warnings that they chose to use, which I showed

23

your Honor, Exhibit 3 from the Fineman deposition, is

24

sufficient.

25

They have not

We have not been consulted, whatsoever.

Now, Mr. Winegarfs approach in this case, if the

1

Court determines that Zep's response, although untimely, that

2

you will go ahead and accept their response as put in, in the

3

untimely fashion, if the Court determines to hear this on the

4

merits and get past that procedural stage, then the question

5

becomes, your Honor, in their approach, they have taken a

6

smokescreen to try and create a factual question from arguing

7

various interpretations of Dr. de Nevers' deposition testimony,

8

which, taken, do not support the fact that there is a fact

9

question.

10

But, more importantly, getting to the bottom line on

11

a motion for summary judgment, your Honor, as a matter of law,

12

has the decision to determine whether my client had a duty.

13

That is a legal question.

14

where we build the pail, we are doing so purely to the

15

specifications given to us by Mr. Winegar.

16

different types of pails that we can build, a number of

17

different types of closure devices that we can offer to a

18

customer.

19

no consultation about what labels are going to be put on it

20

after it leaves our facility, depending on the product they put

21

in.

22

And under the situation at hand,

We have a number of

We are delivering this to their specifications, and

As a matter of law, we have cited to your Honor cases

23

that under this scenario we don't have a duty, as a component

24

manufacturer, to the plaintiff in this case.

25

duty to Zep, under these circumstances, since there is no

We don't have a

8

1

contribution in this state, your Honor.

And the plaintiff

2

would have on the verdict form, if this motion was granted, the

3

parties that this Court determines have a legal duty to the

4

plaintiff.

5

record, as it exists today, that the only person or entity with

6

a legal duty to the plaintiff is Zep, the person who received

7

the container, packaged it, decided what label was going to be

8

put on it, shipped it# and had control of all of those facets,

9

of which we did not have control.

And we submit, your Honor, under the state of the

10

Thank you, your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Response?

Let's talk about

12

the procedural problem first.

13

response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment was

14

several weeks late.

15

any, exist in that regard.

16

The Court noted that the

Explain what mitigating circumstances, if

MR. WINEGAR:

I think this is a very unusual case

17

procedurally, and, frankly, one of the most interesting I have

18

seen in a long time.

19

summary judgment because we weren't going to.

20

we have the burden to.

21

told that the plaintiff was not going to respond, we responded

22

within a few days.

23

the plaintiff would not be responding to the motion for summary

24

judgment, and the next Monday or Tuesday we responded.

25

We did not respond to their motion for
We didn't think

We are still not sure, when we were

I think I was told like on a Thursday that

The reason that we did not respond immediately is

because we donft think that it is our burden to respond.
didn't sue Norton.

We didn't pursue a case against them.

We
As

they have aptly pointed out, we don't think that this pail is
defective.
THE COURT:

Do you object to their motion for summary

judgment?
MR. WINEGAR:

I take this stance.

Norton is still on the verdict form.
THE COURT:

But

I don't object, if

—

Let's talk about that for just a moment,

because that raises an interesting question.

Supposing that

the Court found that there was no expert testimony establishing
any defect in the pail, that they did not participate in any of
the labeling, the product was placed into the container after
it left the hands of the Norton company, and granted the motion
for summary judgment.

What would be the position of the

plaintiff and your client, when it came time to send the matter
in to the jury?
MR. WINEGAR:

I think that the Scoular case governs

that, that Norton could not be on the verdict form, if you
found everything that you just found.

But I don't think that

that's necessarily what you have to find.

In other words, what

has happened here is there are three defendants in this case,
and let's assume, for the sake of argument, that each of them
have one third of the fault.

If the plaintiff pursues the case

against one defendant, and totally ignores the other two, it is

10

1

too expensive, they don't want to do it, they are a third at

2

fault, but they are not going to pursue the case, what that

3

makes is, the first defendant, it obligates them to go out and

4

construct the plaintiffs1 case for them against the other two

5

defendants, and if they fail to do so, then they would have

6

that first defendant would have to pay 100 percent of the

7

fault.

They would have to pay the second and third defendants'

8

fault.

That was never intended by the Tort Reform Act.

9

fact, its specific reason for being drafted was that each

10
11

—

In

defendant pays its own fault.
Now, we think that since the plaintiff didn't respond

12

to the motion for summary judgment, that perhaps the correct

13

result is that if Norton is dismissed, and I think that it is

14

clear that Norton is at fault, as I will show in a minute, but

15

since the defendant didn't respond, they should be on the

16

verdict form.

17

verdict form if the dismissal was due to lack of fault, and,

18

obviously, if Norton is dismissed because of a lack of

19

response, they are still on the jury verdict form.

20

think that's what it is.

21

explain in a minute why Norton is at fault.

22

of response.

23

The Schuler case says you are only not on the

It is not a lack of fault.

Here I
I will

But it is a lack

So that's why I think this is an unusual case.

We, as another defendant, are responding to this

24

motion for summary judgment.

If that is our duty, and if the

25

Court wants to grant summary judgment, we request additional

11

1

time to build the case.

2

necessary; first, because I don't think it is our burden.

3

if Norton is dismissed because of failure to respond to the

4

motion, and as long as it is clear they will still be on the

5

verdict form, we don't object to that.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BELNAP:

But I don't think that that's
And

What is your response?
If we are dismissed under the Sullivan

8

vs. Scoular Grain case, which was my case up at the Supreme

9

Court, the Court —

that was a case certified from federal

10

court with two questions.

Can you compare the fault of a

11

nonparty, immune employer?

That was the fir3t question.

12

The second question is, can you compare the fault of

13

a dismissed party?

14

had been dismissed by Judge Greene on a previous motion for

15

summary judgment on the merits.

16

answered the second question, that if a party has been

17

dismissed, their fault cannot be compared, because they have

18

been determined, as a matter of law, to be appropriately

19

dismissed.

20

In that case, Denver & Rio Grande Railroad

The Utah Supreme Court

So what the plaintiff is arguing, to me, doesn't seem

21

appropriate.

Maybe that's not my argument.

But that's in

22

response to your Honor's question.

23

comparative fault act only asks them to pay their share of

24

fault.

25

proceeds in the shifting of duties of going forward with the

It is correct the

That's all they are responsible for.

How a trial

12

1

evidence and burdens of persuasion and burdens of proof is

2

something they are always going to face, your Honor, in any

3

trial.

4

responsible to show that they weren't at fault.

5

my client, it does not take away from them any arguments about

6

their product.

7

To say this is now shifting it to them, they are only

THE COURT:

That is true.

If you dismiss

But supposing, as Counsel

8

has argued, there are empty chairs in the trial, and Counsel

9

says, We may be at fault, but there are other people who are at

10

fault in this lawsuit, that the plaintiff has elected not to go

11

after, or for some reason the jury need not know they are not

12

involved in this trial, but what we want you to do when you go

13

into the jury room is decide 'v-v._ .e. or not Plaintiff has

14

established their case; and, if so, which of the defendants are

15

at fault, and what their percentage of fault is.

16

If that were permitted in this trial, Norton would

17

not in any way be exposed to a judgment.

18

a factor utilized by another defendant in their hope of

19

reducing, somewhat, the other defendant's liability.

20

MR. BELNAP:

They would simply be

But, your Honor, I submit, respectfully,

21

that would not be appropriate.

This is probably more

22

Mr. King's argument.

23

appear that I am trying to mislead the Court.

24

just as in any case, determines, for legal reasons, that Norton

25

is not liable, then they are not an empty chair to point at.

Let me state why I think, so it doesn't
If this Court,

13

1

There has been a legal determination that Norton should not be

2

a party in this case.

3

point his finger any direction he wants, put on any evidence as

4

to how the accident occurred, causation, anything else.

5

for the jury to determine that Norton was at fault, there would

6

not be a legal basis, because your Honor would have determined,

7

as a matter of law, Norton did not have a duty to warn, as

8

Mr. Winegar seems to imply in his memoranda, even though he

9

wants it both ways, that the pail isn't defective, but maybe we

At that point in time, Mr. Winegar can

But

10

should have warned, there would not be that duty, you would

11

have already decided that question.

12

THE COURT:

The Court agrees with your position.

And

13

it brings us full circle to the question the Court raised

14

earlier.

15

the objection to Norton's motion for summary judgment was

16

untimely, and disregards it, then we do not get to the merits

17

of the motion, do we, procedurally, the motion is unopposed,

18

and it is granted.

19

Procedurally, if the Court finds that the response or

Isn't that the status of the law?

MR. BELNAP:

The status, timing-wise, is that when

20

Mr. Winegar says that he learned the plaintiff wasn't going to

21

respond on the Thursday, it was already a week past the

22

response due date.

23

are, I think, pretty close, if not at, two weeks over the time

24

for having responded, with no telephone calls to our office, or

25

any other communication requesting additional time.

Then he responded the next week.

So we

14

THE COURT:

The Court would like to hear argument

from other counsel on the procedural question that has been
raised in the reply memo.
MR. KING:

Thank you, your Honor.

I think it would

be inappropriate to resolve this matter on a procedural issue.
In fairness to Mr. Winegar, both these counsel, what I did was
study the summary judgment motion, talked to my expert.

I made

a decision that I would rather have this go to a decision on
the merits.

And if the Court denied the case on the merits,

then I would have both parties in front of the jury.
Court —

assuming we go to trial.

If the

If the Court granted the

motion, I would have the trial against Mr. Winegarfs client,
and he wouldn't be able to point at an empty chair.
I told Mr. Belnap sometime near the last portion of
my response time that I intended not —

well, I told him —

I

asked him, first of all, for an extension of a week, and he
granted that to me.

It was oral.

It was not done, I don't

believe, in any writing, was it?
MR. BELNAP:
MR. KING:

No.

But that's a correct statement.

He gave me about a week extension.

Near

the end of that week extension, as I recall, I think I told
Paul Belnap I wasn't going to file a motion —

or response.

I

know I told Mr. Winegar I wasn't going to file a response.
Whereupon, he had a small fit, and said he was going to file
one.

I said, fine, go ahead.

So, in fairness to Mr. Winegar,

15

1

he didn't know that I was not going to file a response, I don't

2

think, until after my response time was finished.

3

THE COURT:

Let's assume that there was no other

4

defendant in the lawsuit, and you elected not to oppose the

5

motion for summary judgment.

6

mandated by law to grant the motion, would it not?

7
8

MR. KING:

Procedurally, the Court would be

Yes, I think that's correct, on the

merits.

9

THE COURT:

Let's add the other component, and that

10

is a co-defendant, who steps in, basically, and takes the

11

plaintiff's laboring oar in the matter.

12

want to object to the motion for summary judgment.

13

Co-defendant now is basically asserting the plaintiff's

14

position.

15

MR. KING:

16

THE COURT:

Plaintiff does not

I think that's correct, your Honor,
Should we extend any more leeway,

17

legally, to a co-defendant, than we would have extended to the

18

plaintiff?

19

MR. KING:

I would think not.

That's why I come to

20

the conclusion that the Court would be compelled to grant the

21

motion for summary judgment on the merits.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. KING:

I think you are right.
If it is going to grant it.

And I think

24

whether the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on the

25

merits, or not, certainly is up to the latitude of the Court.

16

The Court can ignore the procedure irregularity, treat
Mr. Winegar as if in my shoes, and grant the motion or deny the
motion on the merits, should the Court desire.

Certainly

within the Courtfs power.
THE COURT:

Your position is absolutely correct.

in the Court's opinion

And

—

MR. WINEGAR:

Your Honor, first of all, let me quote

from the Schuler case, because I think that the Schuler case
Whatfs the date on that case?

THE COURT:
MR. WINEGAR:
that is not the date

It is filed April 22, 1993.

I presume

—

THE COURT:

Is that a Supreme Court decision?

MR. BELNAP:
Judge Greene.

—

Yes.

Here are the points certified by

The second question is that issue of whether you

can compare the fault of a dismissed party.
THE COURT:

Go ahead now, and direct the Court to the

page and the paragraph.
MR. WINEGAR:
have —

It is on page 11.

Your Honor, I

our office was also involved in that.

So the copy I

have is the one sent to us, and not the one published.
page may not —

So my

it is right near the end of the main opinion.

Let me, first of all, explain two things.

First of

all, it is our theory, NSI f s theory, that the plaintiff hit
himself in the eye with a knife.
be believed by the jury.

But that may not necessarily

And if it is not believed, if they

17

believe Plaintiff's story, then Norton is at fault, and not
NSI.

I can explain that in a minute.
Second of all, we were told that Mr. King was going

to file a response to this.
THE COURT:

Did he tell you that?

MR. WINEGAR:
going to file it.

Yes, he did.

And he indicated he was

In fact, I was going to send him some

information over to incorporate in it.

Then near the end he

indicated he would not be filing it, and if I wanted to file
anything, that I needed to, which I did a few days later.
MR. KING:

He is right.

said I was going to do something.
questions.

I had some doubts.

that would be helpful to me.
come over.

I forgot that.

I originally

But I said I had some

He said he had some material
I said send it over.

But we talked again.

It didn ! t

That's when I indicated I

wasnf t.
MR. WINEGAR:

So if this is going to be dismissed on

a procedural basis, I would think it would not be appropriate,
with Counsel cooperating like this, to do it just because a
deadline has passed.

The procedural basis that I think is the

more interesting question, and I must admit to the Court it is
not clear, that is that the Supreme Court has not decided this,
but I think that the result is fair, and that is the Schuler
case says never —

it says that, nevertheless, we hold that

D&RG, which was dismissed pursuant to an adjudication on the

18

merits, and those are the key words, may not be included in
apportionment.

D&RG was dismissed due to a lack of fault, as a

matter of law.

If that's the circumstance, I think it is clear

Norton cannot be on the verdict form, if the Court looks at the
motion, looks at the arguments, and decides, as a matter of
law, Norton has no fault.

They are not on the verdict form.

But in the prior paragraph to that, it says a
plaintiff may have legal grounds for a cause of action against
a defendant, and the defendant may be dismissed due, for
example, the assertion of a successful affirmative defense.
Thus the Act's definition of fault does not necessarily
preclude the apportionment of fault of nonparties.

So if the

Court dismisses them, even though there is a question, based
on —

there is a disputed fact of their fault, but dismisses

them on a procedural ground, because of nonresponse, then I
think it is appropriate that they are on the jury verdict form.
THE COURT:
MR. KING:

What's your response to that?
May I respond, your Honor?

THE COURT:
MR. WINEGAR:

Let's hear from both of you.
So I think that is it.

As I would be

glad to explain, I think if Plaintiff's story is believed, that
Norton is at fault.
As far as the procedural issue, I think it is an
interesting issue, whether the plaintiff can force a defendant
to come forward, hire experts, and go prove a case against the

19

1

other defendants.

2

MR. KING:

Your Honor, I haven't forced any defendant

3

to do anything,

4

summary judgment.

5

the outcome will be different.

6

is going to be.

7

the Court to decide to dismiss this case on the procedural

8

technicality that I didn't file a response.

9

and I will say in open court I made no response to the motion

10

I could have made an opposition, and maybe
I don't know what the outcome

It would be a penalization of my client for

formally, because I thought it lacked —

11
12

I made a decision to not oppose motion for

THE COURT:

I made a response,

it had merit.

The motion for summary judgment had

merit?

13

MR. KING:

Yes.

My client should not be penalized by

14

my not responding, which would happen if the Court then ignored

15

the motion on its merits, and left this defendant in the case

16

as someone to point the blame at by the other side.

17

be gross misjustice —

18

your Honor.

19

motion for summary judgment presented to it, then the Court has

20

an obligation, under the rules, to decide the motion on its

21

merits.

22

setting any differently than if I had responded.

23

violated any rules by not responding, have I?

24

have to respond.

25

That would

miscarriage of justice, it seems to me,

I think that when the Court finds itself having a

I didn't respond.

THE COURT:

I don't think that puts this
I haven't

I don't think I

The plaintiff could have gone fishing

20

today, and filed no response prior to today1s hearing.
defendant would have come in.

The

The Court would have granted the

motion on the lack of opposition to the summary judgment, on
the merits, based on the pleadings, and it would have been
over.
MR. KING:

And Mr. Winegar is trying to be in a

position of having been penalized somehow, but he is simply
not.

It simply is his problem.

client.

I have got claims against his

But it doesnft make him in any worse situation if this

case is dismissed against Norton.
to me.

Frankly, it doesn't matter

It literally doesn't matter to me.

file a response.

That's why I didn't

I didn't file a response, because I am

convinced there is no possible claim against Norton.

It

literally doesn't make any difference to me if it is both these
defendants at trial, or one.

But Mr. Winegar simply can't

claim prejudice by this procedure, any more than he could claim
prejudice by him being forced to argue that the plaintiff's
sister somehow caused the accident.
caused the accident.

He can claim anybody

But once the Court is faced with a

summary judgment proceeding on someone that has been brought
before the Court, I think the Court is compelled to decide that
on the merits.
MR. WINEGAR:
fallacies there.

Your Honor, I think that there are two

First of all, he indicates it doesn't matter

to the plaintiff what happens, whether Norton is in there or

21

1

not.

2

THE COURT:

He argued just the opposite.

He said it

3

would be blatantly unfair for the Court to dismiss the case on

4

a procedural basis, and then have Norton on the verdict form,

5

because it would dilute or water down any judgment that the

6

plaintiff gets against your client, if you can say your client

7

was only 30 percent liable, and the empty chair was another 20

8

percent liable, and between them there is 50 percent liability

9

on the defendants' side, and the plaintiff gets nothing.

10

MR. WINEGAR:

I agree with that.

I guess it is the

11

other side of the coin that I am looking at.

That is it is

12

blatantly unfair to my client to go along here and just a

13

couple of days before —

14

extension to file a motion for summary judgment, find out that

15

there is none, and presuming, for a minute, that Norton is at

16

fault, and I think I can show that quite clearly, then my

17

client has to pay all of Norton's fault, just because of this

18

procedural error, that I didn't know the plaintiff wasn't going

19

to file, and that I have not gone and hired experts against

20

Norton.

21

version is believed, then, under those circumstances, then it

22

is.

23

the plaintiff hit himself in the eye with a knife, but also to

24

go and defend Norton's case, or the case against the plaintiff,

25

of hiring experts to prove that Norton was at fault.

actually, a couple of days after the

I don't think Norton is at fault.

But if Plaintiff's

It is literally forcing me not to only put on my case that

I take

22

part of the plaintifffs case, and have to prove Norton is at
fault, just in case the plaintiff's story is believed.

And so,

you know, I mean, I agree it is unfair to Plaintiff's client,
but it is unfair to my client, too.

It is a very unusual

procedural issue, and maybe, because of that, we ought to go on
and decide it on the merits.

But if it is decided on a

procedural issue, I think that issue should be that we had no
notice, that we were supposed to put on Plaintiff's case, and
we should either be given more time so we can put on
Plaintiff's case against Norton, or they should be on the jury
verdict form.
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:

All right, anything else from anybody?
Just to briefly say, your Honor, this

isn't trying to catch somebody in a trap type motion.
THE COURT:
of any kind.

The Court has not detected any collusion

I think the parties were all up front with their

respective positions.
MR. BELNAP:

This motion was made right after

discovery was cut off, your Honor.

His talking about the

burdens are not unlike what any defendant would face in a case,
anyway.
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:
MR. WINEGAR:
we do.

Do all counsel submit?
Yes.
Your Honor, on the procedural matter,

But we still have our response to the motion.

I would

23

1

like to explain that, because I think that it is clear, from

2

Plaintiff's expert, Dr. de Nevers, that it was Norton's can

3

that caused this injury, and not any contents.

4

THE COURT:

Let's think outloud for a minute, so that

5

you understand what the Court is inclined to do, and then the

6

Court will give you an opportunity to respond to its advisory

7

ruling.

8

Norton's motion for summary judgment filed by National Service

9

Industries.

The Court is inclined to disregard the opposition to

And the reason being that it was not timely filed.

10

It was two weeks out.

11

that there is a motion for summary judgment by the defendant

12

Norton.

13

inclined to find that, based on the merits of the motion, that

14

Norton is entitled to summary judgment.

15
16
17

Therefore, the status of the record is

The plaintiff has not responded.

And the Court is

Now, would anyone like to argue anything in response
to that?
MR. WINEGAR:

I would like to argue on the merits.

18

think that my client has no fault in not responding.

19

thought the plaintiff was responding.

20

matter of days, once we found out the plaintiff was not

21

responding.

22

all of Norton's fault, which could be tens, maybe hundreds of

23

thousands of dollars, just because we were told that the

24

plaintiff was going to respond, and, therefore, didn't respond

25

ourselves, until we were told they were not.

I

We

We responded within a

My client is severely penalized, having to pay for

I don't think

24

1

that is a fair result.

2

normally respond to a motion for summary judgment of J. : ..-.-:

3

defendant.

4

circumstance, where the plaintiff didn't respond, and once they

5

didn't, then another defendant had to.

6
7
8
9

I don't think that the defendants

It is rare.

THE COURT:

I can't even recall having seen this

What does the Court have as an

alternative, legally?
MR. WINEGAR:

I think that the alternative is to

indicate that, because of the circumstances, the Court will

10

consider our response to the motion for summary judgment, will

11

listen, the Court has read the briefs, will listen to the

12

argument on the merits, and make a decision on the merits.

13

THE COURT:

Then Norton cries foul, saying that the

14

law is clear and unequivocal that there was a time designated

15

for response, or an objection to the motion for summary

16

judgment, there was no time in response; therefore, the Court

17

is required to consider the motion on its merits, grant it, and

18

award summary judgment.

19

MR. BELNAP:

That's Norton's position.
Well, that's as we have argued it, that

20

is a part of the position, your Honor.

But I think maybe

21

putting this case into scenario and into sequence may be

22

helpful, as well.

23

Mr. Winegar took his deposition months ago, at that point in

24

time Mr. King stepped forward in a candid manner with both

25

counsel and said, I don't see any evidence against Norton to

When we took Dr. de Nevers' deposition, when

25

1

keep them in this case.

2

this case, so long as Mr, Winegar does not try to point the

3

finger at them at trial,

4

And I am willing to let Norton out of

Mr. Winegar would not agree to do that at that point

5

in time.

So, basically, he was put in the position at that

6

point, better get your case together and your experts together

7

and be aware that this thing is coming down the track.

8

let discovery go by.

9

Honor is now faced with a motion before you, on the merits,

So we

We make our motion on the merits.

Your

10

which you can read and determine, as a matter of law, based on

11

the briefing that existed, that it is well taken, and grant it.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BELNAP:

And the briefing is without opposition.
Right.

But your Honor still has the

14

discretion to look at it.

15

merits of the briefing, that it i3 well taken, your Honor.

16
17

THE COURT:

I would admit that.

And on the

And consider the motion in opposition by

NSI?

18

MR. BELNAP:

Well, that's a decision you will have to

19

make.

20

you decide you want to consider that, I am saying, on the

21

merits, this is a good-faith motion that ought to be granted,

22

as a matter of law, for the reasons I argued at the outset.

23

We don't think that's appropriate, your Honor.

MR. WINEGAR:

But if

And, your Honor, on that, I think that

24

there is no one has been hurt, none of the parties, none of the

25

attorneys that are hurt by having a decision on the merits.

26

In

fact, we have been very cooperative amongst each other.
was a —

There

some informal telephone calls that were made to obtain

an extension to answer, and another informal call to me, to
indicate that they would not answer.
that those informal —

And if this Court rules

this informal cooperation that we have

all had will go for naught, and that there are deadlines that,
unless met, I think that it ruins the cooperation, from now on,
we will have to start writing letters and say if you don't
respond by such and such a date, then I am going to respond.
Please let me know your intentions and file the appropriate
documents with the court.
THE COURT:

Your position —

counsel, not between you and the Court.

your argument is between
The Court had nothing

to do with the granting of extensions or relaxing the order for
pretrial order in this matter.

It is now a co-defendant who is

asserting that there was no timely response.

The Court is not,

on its own motion, making that opposition.
MR. WINEGAR:

You are absolutely right.

I am saying is two things.

I guess what

First of all, if that is the

Court's position, that if something is a couple of days late,
that it will be stricken, from now on our firm and all other
firms will not cooperate like this.

We will always send things

to you directly, asking for extensions, getting stipulations,
filing them.

If that's the way the Court wants it to happen,

then that's great, and we will do that from now on.
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1

THE COURT:

The Court is not saying thatfs its

2

position at all.

3

memo, Norton is saying there was not a timely objection on the

4

motion for summary judgment, and we want the Court to enforce

5

the lack of a timely opposition.

6

page 2.

7

The Court is simply saying that, in the reply

That's in the pleadings, on

It is not the Court's motion.
MR. WINEGAR:

And I understand that.

I guess what I

8

am saying is that, with the cooperation here, no one has

9

complained if interrogatories are a few days late, if anything

10

like this is a few days late.

11

when I think I did everything possible —

12

fairly complex motion in the manner of two or three days.

13

I think that's all I could do.

14

days, I was under the understanding that the plaintiff would

15

file a response.

16

Plaintiff talked with Counsel, and Counsel can have no

17

objection up to that time, that there was an extension, and

18

once Plaintiff's counsel said, No, I am not going to respond,

19

he told me, and we responded within two or three days.

20

And for my client to be punished
I responded to a
And

Up until that two or three

Plaintiff got the extension of time.

That's all I can do.

I don't think there is more

21

that I could have done, except for —

I am not sure.

I guess

22

when it was filed, to request the Court to rule that we didn't

23

have to respond to it, and the plaintiff would.

24

an extension, right up front, not knowing what would happen;

25

that if the plaintiff didn't respond, we would.

Or to ask for

The plaintiff
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1

was going to respond.

2

right up until a couple of days before we did it,

3

think that justice is served, to decide this matter on a

4

procedural issue. If, as Mr. Belnap argues, the motion is well

5

taken, then grant it, based on the merits.

6

it is well taken, and I think Dr. de Nevers points that out in

7

his testimony, and I think that the Court should hear that and

8

depend on justice between the parties.

9

THE COURT:

They told us they were going to respond,
I just donft

But I don't think

Anything further before the Court rules

10

on the question of whether or not to consider NSI's opposition

11

to Norton!s motion, and then decide the case on the merits?

12

MR. BELNAP:

No, I think we have argued it, Judge.

13

THE COURT:

It is clear to the Court that there was

14

not a timely response by way of opposition to Nortonfs motion

15

for summary judgment.

16

informal agreement between counsel, consider the pleadings

17

filed by NSI in opposition to Norton's motion for summary

18

judgment, and you may argue the merits, or the lack thereof.

19

MR. KING:

However, the Court will, in light of the

Your Honor, may I just say, before we go

20

on, I think that's an appropriate decision by the Court.

I

21

kind of feel somewhat responsible for Mr. Winegar's dilemma.

22

think the Court is recognizing something that is commonly done

23

among counsel, to try to work together.

24

deadlines like this all the time.

25

involved.

Normally, we extend

The Court doesn't get

It furthers the interest of justice.

I think the
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I

1
2

Court has resolved this appropriately.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I appreciate it.

You may proceed.

Let the

3

Court ask two or three pointed questions, and then argue as you

4

deem appropriate.

5

your candid opinion, an expert who will say the container that

6

was made by Norton, and given to your client, was defective?

7

Do you now have or will you ever have, in

MR. WINEGAR:

Yes, your Honor.

I think that

8

Dr. de Nevers says that.

9

out of California, who is our expert, who would do that, too.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. WINEGAR:

We would also have Larry Anderson,

What was defective about it?
I think that there are three points,

12

three disputed facts regarding its defect.

13

this physics is hard to understand.

14

Dr. de Nevers1 deposition, and you are going to see I didnft

15

understand it.

16

the deposition before I understood it.

17

Frankly, some of

I am going to quote from

It took me several hours with Dr. de Nevers in

The first disputed fact, the first item I should

18

indicate is Dr. de Nevers did not say the can was defective.

19

That is true.

20

product was defective.

21

opinions, and then, of course, a bunch of subopinions, factual

22

information to back those up.

23
24
25

But neither did Dr. de Nevers say that NSI's
Dr. de Nevers offered just three

First of all, he said the accident was caused by gas
pressure driving the seal into the eye of the plaintiff.
THE COURT:

What did Norton have to do with that?

30

MR. WINEGAR:

Well, if I may, there is only one of

these three opinions that matters, and that's the one that
shows what Norton has to do.
seal into his eye.

The first one is that it hit the

The second opinion was that a similar

container had approximately five pounds of pressure, and that
was enough to drive it into the eye.

And the third was that

the cause of the pressure was dissolved air.
one we have to talk about.

That's the only

That is the one that shows that

Norton was responsible for it.
I think that the big misunderstanding we have had
here is whether it was the contents of the container that
created this pressure, or the container itself.

And the facts

that Norton lists as undisputed are No. 3, which says that NSI
made the determination what finished product would be placed in
the pail.

That is true, too.

But it doesn't ask the correct

question, and that is, was it the container that caused the
pressure, or the contents?
Also, fact No. 4, that they claim is undisputed, NSI
never consulted what type of —

with Norton what type of

product would be put into the container.
but it doesn't ask the right question.

Again, it is true,
The question is, was it

the contents of the container that created the pressure?
was, I have to admit Norton should be out.
contents that created the pressure.

If it

But it was not the

It was the container

itself.
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1
2

THE COURT:

Would your expert say, if that had been

filled with water, there would have been an explosion?

3

MR. WINEGAR:

Exactly.

If it would have been filled

4

with water, there would have been the same effect, if it would

5

have been filled with nothing.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. WINEGAR:

Sand?
Your Honor, I don't know sand for sure,

8

because it is designed for liquids, and I have only talked

9

about liquids.

I am guessing sand would.

I don't know that.

10

Norton's testimony was it was designed for things like food

11

products, vegetable oil, paint, ink, the cleaning solution we

12

had in it, any of those, the result would have been the same,

13

including water or empty.

14

And I think that Dr. de Nevers indicated there are

15

three possible causes of the can pressure.

16

two is temperature, and three is a chemical reaction.

17

Dr. de Nevers discusses those three possibilities.

18

the only three possibilities.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. WINEGAR:

One is altitude,
And

Those are

But he doesn't point the finger?
Yes.

He eliminates the chemical

21

reaction.

And the chemical reaction is the only one we are

22

responsible for.

23

deposition, "Let me make sure I understand the possibilities of

24

the air coming out of the solution.

25

are the possibilities.

He says —

I say on page 54 of the

I want to make sure what

The first possibility is that a mere
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rise in altitude brings some air out of the solution."
says, "No, that is incorrect."

He

It takes me a page or so to get

the correct answer, which I will read to you.
On the next page, he says, "Recognize the distinction
between pressure inside the container and pressure difference
from inside the container to outside the container.

Change in

altitude does not change the pressure inside the container but
it does change the difference in pressure."
And what that is, your Honor, Dr. de Nevers testified
this was filled in Santa Clara, California, which is in the Bay
Area.

The sea level pressure there is 14.7 pounds.

And so

when that can is filled up, and sealed, it has 14.7 pounds in
it.

It then comes to Salt Lake City.

Dr. de Nevers says that

here in Salt Lake we have 12 and a half pounds of pressure.
But this, because it is sealed, still has the 14.7.
is a difference in pressure.
but there is a difference.

So there

There is not really an increase,
This now is pressurized to 2.2

pounds relative here to Salt Lake City.
It is kind of a potato chip bag effect.
seen a potato chip bag that's blown up.
is just puffed out.

We have all

It gets filled, and it

That doesn!t matter with potato chips,

because the container gives.
there is pressure inside.

This container did not give.

So

So we have altitude is the first

possible cause.
And Dr. de Nevers continues on page 54, "So causing
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the air to come out of solution may be caused by a temperature
difference?
"A.

Yes,

"Q.

What other potential causes?

"A.

Chemical reactions.

"Q.

Would other potential causes?

"A.

Those are the only ones I can think of."

There are only three, temperature, altitude and
chemical.

He eliminates the chemical response.

he does a lot of tests.

He says —

and

He does a mass spectrometry test, he

does a gas chromatograph test.

He looks for peroxides in it.

He tries to see if the contents, this cleaning solution, has
interacted with the steel of the pail, with the sealant that's
around the lid, with the liner that's in the pail, and he comes
up with nothing.

There was no chemical reaction.

it is kind of long —

this is the question,

there were efforts to find other causes.

He says

—

"You indicate that

What other causes did

you consider and eliminate?
"A.

Chemical reactions between the ingredients in

Zep high-foam degreaser, formation of peroxides.

I think

that's all.
"Q.

Your information on the formation of peroxides

is contained in your notes?
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

You concluded that peroxides were not formed?
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1

"A.

I could not show that they had been formed,

2

"Q.

In fact, I presume it is your opinion that they

3

were not formed and were not a cause of this accident?

4

"A.

5

Yes, that is correct."

And then back on page 55, when he says that a

6

possibility of creating the pressure was the chemicals, I ask,

7

"Have you considered any particular chemical reaction that

8

might plausibly have caused it?

9

He says, "You will recall that I told you I studied

10

the question of chemical reaction, and I discussed it with

11

people more knowledgeable than I, and, based on what they told

12

me and on the analysis of the gas in the head space, concluded

13

that it was extremely unlikely.

14

other causes were, and what the causes could have been, and I

15

answered."

16

But you asked me what the

So he says that he has eliminated by his analysis the

17

chemical reaction.

18

temperature difference.

19

an exemplar lid of the pail.

20

Evidently, it was not on the one in question.

21

pry-out lid that the plaintiff claims hit his eye.

22

temperature —

23

Dr. de Nevers isn't sure how much the temperature difference

24

was.

25

So this is caused by altitude and
If I could show to the Court, this is
This spout is questionable.
But this is the
This

this altitude difference is the main component.

In fact, the temperature difference was only a few
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It was somewhere probably in the 60fs when this was

1

degrees.

2

filled on an August morning in Santa Clara, California, and it

3

was about low to mid 70's in June in a temperature-controlled

4

warehouse when this was opened.

5

here is just the difference between sea level and Salt Lake

6

City.

7

have happened if it was vegetable oil, it would have happened

8

if it was water.

So the main difference we have

And that would have happened if it was ink, it would

9

In fact, Dr. de Nevers says that if there is more air

10

in there, there is more force.

11

actually reduced the explosive power by putting the soap in it.

12

Had there been more air in there, it would have been even more

13

explosive.

14

that it was being shipped around.

15

to have a liquid in it.

16

make any difference and didn't cause this means that it was the

17

container, and not the contents.

18

So it can be argued that we

We use thcT exactly as they anticipated.

They knew

They knew that it was going

And the fact that the degreaser didn't

Now, there is one other disputed fact that they claim

19

that is inaccurate, and that is their disputed fact No. 7.

20

says the design on the outside of the BW Norton pail supplied

21

to NSI is generic, so that paper labels can be applied to the

22

pail, depending on what material is placed in the pail.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. WINEGAR:

25

question.

It

That's true, is it not?
It is true.

Again, it begs the

We put a label on there that tells you everything
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you want to know about the contents of the pail.
what caused the injury.
an injury.

This lid is

The contents of the pail didn!t cause

And the instructions, if I may give this to the

Court, say pry out, with an arrow pointing to a hole.

Those

were instructions that came with the pail, on how to open it.
This was an accident that occurred while opening it.

And if

those instructions are inaccurate, if there is some sort of
lack of warning on the opening instructions, those are not our
instructions.

That's exactly how we got it.

those instructions on there.

We didn't emboss

We decide how appropriate they

were.
It is interesting to note that Norton's opinion on
how this should be opened, and, obviously, the instructions, it
points to that little hole.

If you puncture that hole, it

would release any altitude pressure, and this accident wouldn't
have happened.

Certainly, any inadequacy in those instructions

is Norton's problem.

It is not our problem.

They were the

ones who decided what kind of instructions or warnings were
there.
that.

And they are the ones that should be accountable for
We warned on the contents.

cause any damage.

But the contents didn't

This small lid with the instructions already

embossed on it by Norton is, according to the plaintiff's
theory, the item that caused the injury, and it was caused,
according to the plaintiff's expert, by this difference in
altitude, and a slight difference in temperature.

And those,
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1

again, are not contents.

2

ink, paint, or with the soap that we had in there.

3

It would have happened with water,

In summary, although Dr. de Nevers never says the can

4

is defective, never says the product is defective, he does a

5

fairly long list of scientific tests, and eliminates any kind

6

of chemical reaction in there, and opines that it is altitude

7

and temperature differences.

8

that the instructions on opening were already embossed when we

9

got it, shows that it was not the contents of the container

10

that caused this accident, but it was the container itself.

11

Therefore, BW Norton is responsible for that.

12

And that, together with the fact

I should note, as always, that we only have to raise

13

a factual question.

14

Plaintiff's expert has put on a case that it is the container

15

rather than the contents.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BELNAP:

Here I think there is more than that.

Counsel?
Your Honor, I will try to be brief,

18

because I think your Honor is aware of the issues, but there

19

are a couple of points I want to discuss.

20

case is ripe for summary judgment.

21

the duty issue of BW Norton.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BELNAP:

First of all, this

It is a legal question on

The duty to warn?
The duty to warn.

And also with respect

24

to the cases that have dealt with the component part

25

manufacturer, which we fall into line with, your Honor.
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If you look at the undisputed testimony in this case,
there may be a 2.2 pound pressure differential, but it was
measured in a container from the same batch at over five pounds
of pressure differential.

But to get to the heart of what I

want to speak to in calling this a container problem, and not a
product problem, Mr. Winegar ignores the fact that he packages
this product.

He fills the container.

He puts the lid on.

He

chooses how much head space he is going to leave between the
level of the liquid product and the top of the lid, which is
significant, according to Dr. de Nevers.

They are the people

in total control of this operation.
Let's look at the deposition testimony, your Honor,
that I think locks the door on this motion, Mr. Graham, the
engineer from Santa Clara or San Jose.

"To your knowledge, did

anyone at Zep ever indicate to anyone from BW Norton that the
materials that would be placed in any of these steel pails
would be such that would create any vapor pressure or head
space pressure?
"A.
problem.

Well, of course, we didn't, because it was not a

To my knowledge, we are getting the same pail now as

then."
Let's go to the Ph.D. engineer who is in charge of
research, development, and this product, out of Atlanta.

If I

could approach and let your Honor follow in his deposition.
This is Dr. Fineman, your Honor.

Please turn, if you would,
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1

back to page 82, line 23.

"We have talked here in this

2

deposition about the fact that you don't anticipate that the

3

chemicals that make up this product would result in any

4

significant head pressure, unless stored in an oven, or these

5

other examples you used.

Do you remember that discussion?

6

"A.

That's correct.

7

"Q.

Given that testimony on your part, do you have

8

any information which would indicate that at any time Zep ever

9

advised my client, who manufactured these pails at one time or

10

another for Zep, that these particular pails needed to be a

11

pressure vessel?

12

"A.

For this product?

13

"Q.

Yes.

14

"A.

No, not that I am aware of."

15
16

Then there was some discussion by Mr* Winegar about
temperature variation can possibly raise vapor pressure.

17

Going over to page 84, line 4, "And within those

18

parameters, do you believe these particular pails of the type

19

that Mr. King has shown you in the photographs are fit for the

20

purpose of this chemical that you put in them?

21

"A.

22

Yes, they are."

Now, getting to the labeling issue, which is totally

23

in the control of Zep, your Honor, I would like to go over to

24

page —

25

starting on page 85, going through 86 and 87, the label that I

let me just represent, for the sake of time, that
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showed you previously was talked about.

And it was indicated

and admitted that that was a document they prepared.

And what

is significant, if you turn to page 88, where I have got the
yellow tab, Mr. King asks the question, on line 16, "But I do
want to establish one thing.

This warning about wearing

eyeglasses was never intended by Zep to address the possibility
of the cap being propelled off because of the head space
pressure, was it?
"A.

No, because we have never had a situation of

that kind occur."

This is significant, your Honor.

"But the

warning applies to the handling of the product, the product
container, call it what you will, simply is a matter of
prudence and precaution.

In this case it would have protected

the gentleman."
So Dr. Fineman there is indicating that the warning
that they decided to put on, they authored, they wrote it, they
never consulted with my client about it, they never asked for
input, they never asked for a pressure vessel, when we carry a
variety of products, that can release pressure, and they
specify to us they wanted this cap, with this inner seal.
is their product.

They are in control of it.

It

As a matter of

law, the motion is well taken, your Honor.
MR. WINEGAR:
THE COURT:
MR. WINEGAR:

May I respond to this?
Brief response.
Your Honor, this is a matter of forming
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1

the issues.

2

there is anything the matter with the pail.

3

absolutely right.

4

But that!s not the question.

5

factual issue that the jury might not believe our people, and

6

may believe the plaintiff's story, and may believe the

7

plaintiff's expert?

8

And I acknowledge it is unusual to read these quotes from our

9

people that it is not defective.

10

defective.

11

reasons.

12

What he indicates is that our people don't think
And he is

We think he was hit in the eye with a knife.
The question is, is there a

That's the question on summary judgment.

We don't think it is

But the plaintiff's expert does.

It does for two

The Court was very apropos in its first question it

13

asked to me, and that was, would this have happened if this was

14

water?

15

quoted from Dr. de Nevers.

16

took me a long time to understand it, and that is it is the

17

altitude increase.

18

paint, even if it is empty.

19

container.

20

is responsible.

21

The answer is yes.

That has not been disputed.

I have

I have showed the Court what it

It happens if it is vegetable oil, water,
It is not the contents of the

And if Plaintiff's story is believed, then Norton

This is happening —

this could happen with

22

degreaser, it could happen when they ship paint to Denver, it

23

could happen when they ship vegetable oil up to Snowbird.

24

that is the true facts of the case, Norton needs to do

25

something about their product.

If
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The second thing is the duty to warn.
the Court that inner seal.
wasn't the degreaser.
that seal.
Norton.

I have showed

That is what caused the damage.

He wasn't hurt by the degreaser.

It

It was

And the instructions on that seal were made by

If those instructions are inadequate, if they are

incomplete, it is Norton!s responsibility to instruct as to the
container.
contents.

Our responsibility is to instruct as to the
But the contents did no injury.

Because of the fact

that the plaintiff's story is believed, Norton is responsible,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
THE COURT:

All sides submit?

MR. WINEGAR:

Yes, your Honor.

MR. BELNAP:

Yes.

THE COURT:

The Court has permitted the opposition

filed by NSI to be considered in Norton's motion for summary
judgment.

The Court has read the pleadings.

heard the argument.

The Court has

And the Court finds and rules as follows.

The record is deficient in establishing, by expert
opinion or otherwise, any evidence that would suggest the
container, in and of itself, was defective in any way.
record is further defective

—

The

or lacking, rather, in

suggesting that the manufacturer of the container either had
the responsibility or the option of placing any label upon the
container that would suggest to an ultimate consumer how they
should deal with the container and/or its contents.
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1

The Court finds that there has been no evidence

2

advanced by the co-defendant NSI that would suggest that the

3

Norton company made a defective product, that they were remiss

4

in failing to correctly warn by appropriate labeling, or that

5

they owed a duty, either to NSI or any other ultimate user or

6

consumer of this container and its contents, to do anything

7

other than what they in fact did.

8
9

The Court further finds that the duty to warn did not
exist with Norton.

The lid was a component part, and there is

10

no expert testimony that anything was defective, either in the

11

lid or in the instruction on removing the lid from the

12

container.

13

The Court finds that the defendant's motion is well

14

taken, because there is no genuine issue of material fact,

15

regarding their liability to the plaintiff, or to any other

16

person, other than what they did in the construction of the

17

container.

18

The Court is mindful there may be some speculation by

19

the expert on what could have happened, but there is nothing in

20

the record that is remotely close to an opinion by the expert

21

that Norton did anything that was inappropriate in the

22

assembling or the distribution of their containers.

23

Based on those findings, the Court concludes, as a

24

matter of law, Norton is entitled to summary judgment, and so

25

rules.
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The Court orders that Norton prepare exhaustive,
detailed, thorough, itemized, specific findings of fact,
including, but not necessarily limited to, those made by the
Court from the bench.

If they are appropriate, the Court will

adopt them in its opinion.

The Court orders that the findings

of fact and the conclusions of law and the order be submitted
to the Court for signature on or before May 30, 1994.
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, could we have just a few

days beyond that?
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:
MR. WINEGAR:

June 6.
That would be great.
Is that agreeable?
Yes.

May I ask one thing?

Could we

publish the depositions that I referred to today?
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:
from extensively.

Any objection?
No.
Motion is granted.

They have been quoted

And the motion to publish is granted.

(This proceeding was concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I, BRAD

J.

YOUNG, hereby

certify

that I attended

and

reported, as official court reporter, the proceedings in the
above-entitled and numbered matter before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian and that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription
of my stenographic notes thereof.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 24th day of Oct., 1994.

BRAD J. YOUNG
/ j
OFFICIAL .COURT REPORTER

Thifi Judicial District

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc.
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

SEP 1 2 1994

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHERMAN D. PACKER,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES,
INC., a Delaware corporation;
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL MACHINE & TOOL
WORKS, an Illinois limited
partnership,

Civil No. 920902466CV

Hon. Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 16th day of May, 1994, at the hour of 9:00 A.M., before
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge, on defendant
B. W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Counsel of record appeared on behalf of the plaintiff

and defendants, National Service Industries (hereinafter "NSI")

and B. W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (hereinafter
"Norton").
The court received and reviewed the memoranda filed in
support of and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
and considered the merits of the matter including the memoranda
filed by NSI and the argument of counsel for NSI overruling the
objection of defendant Norton as to the failure of NSI to comply
with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
After having reviewed the aforementioned memoranda and
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the Court
determined that the motion for summary judgment filed by Norton
should be granted for the following reasons:
The court concluded that there were no material disputed
issues of fact and that the facts established that Norton
manufactured the steel pail in question with a steel cover/lid
that incorporated a pour spout.

The pour spout, cap and seal

were manufactured by International Machine & Tool and were
installed into the cover for the steel pail by Norton.
The steel pail was manufactured pursuant to the
specifications of NSI and Norton shipped to NSI the component
parts consisting of the cover and steel pail.
-2-

NSI did not consult with Norton concerning what product
they would place in the pail and as a matter of practice, NSI
would package their own product in the pail, close the container,
apply a warning label authored by NSI to the container and would
ship the product to an NSI customer without consulting with
Norton at any step in that process.
The steel pail in question was received by NSI in its
component parts in a generic painted condition.

NSI packaged the

Hi-Foam Degreaser product in the pail, closed the container and
then applied its own warning and instruction label to the pail
without consulting Norton in the process.
The warning/instruction label applied to the pail was
authored by NSI and NSI did not consult with Norton concerning
the content of the same.
Norton was never advised by NSI that the steel pail and
components shipped to NSI would contain products creating vapor
pressure in the head space and NSI never consulted Norton or
asked for a steel pail that would be a pressure vessel.
Engineers from NSI had no opinion that the steel pail
components were defective.

No expert in the case rendered such

opinion.
-3-

As a component part manufacturer supplying the steel pail
and cover under the circumstances and conditions involved, Norton
did not have a duty to warn.
At the time the pail left Norton, it was not in a
defective condition.
For the reasons stated above and as indicated by the
court in its ruling on the motion, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for
Summary Judgment of defendant Norton is granted and the claims of
the plaintiff against defendant Norton are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
The depositions referenced in the parties' memoranda and
in the argument of counsel of Spencer Graham, Manuel Fineman,
Noel de Nevers, Gerald Bettridge, and Howard Norton are
published.
With the dismissal of defendant Norton, and based upon
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain, et al., the trier of fact will not be asked to determine
an issue of fault or causation of the accident relative to
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defendant Norton,
DATED t h i s

/^L
d a y of
v V ^ J^2tfJ*Jr.
JJL
day
of >Q&&0
JSSM^M.

. 1994,

BY THE XOURT

G~Ja

Pat B. Brian
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this fo<^ day of June, 1994, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment was
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Colin P. King
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Todd S. Winegar
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant National Service Industries
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

f
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CHARLES COTESWORTA
PlNCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER

Georgia

WILLIAM FEW,

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed

ABR BALDWIN

In Convention Monday September 17th 178?

AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]

Present The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Absent
and Ratification, and that each Convention assenting
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof
to the United States in Congress assembled
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention,
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which shall
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and
the Time and Place for commencing Proceeding^ under this Constitution That after such Publication the
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and
Representatives elected That the Electors should
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned,
that the Senators should appoint a President of the
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and
counting the Votes for President, and, that after he
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
Go WASHINGTON, Presidt W JACKSON, Secretary

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII
AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances

No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered m
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
DT Ynfotfanem. t£ a CVronu 5\xry, except m rases ansmg
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger, nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law
AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
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I Declaration of Rights
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Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties, to acquire,
possess and protect property, to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences, to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances, to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right

Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land
1896
Sec. 4.

Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,J'
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuatee
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-J"
tablish this CONSTITUTION
1896

DECLARATION O F RIGHTS

1896

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people, and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require
1896

PREAMBLE

ARTICLE I

[Irrevocable franchises forbidden ]
[Uniform operation of laws ]
[Rights retained by people ]
[Provisions mandatory and prohibitory ]
[Fundamental rights]
[Declaration of the rights of crime victims ] [Proposed ]

[Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or hold office.]

The rights of conscience shall never be infringed
The State shall make no law respecting an estabhshment of religion or prohibiting t h e free exercise
thereof, no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote a t
any election, nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof There shall be no union of Church
arid State, nor shall any church dominate t h e State or
interfere with its functions No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for t h e support of any ecclesiastical establishment No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution

Section
1 [Inherent and inalienable rights ]
2 [All political power inherent in the people ]
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union ]
,0
4 [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office ]
1896
5 [Habeas corpus ]
6 [Right to bear arms ]
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
7 [Due process of law ]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
8 [Offenses bailable ]
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments •]] be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it
1896
10 [Trial by jury ]
11 [Courts open — Redress of injuries]
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
12 [Rights of accused persons ]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
[Rights of accused persons ] [Proposed ]
— arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
13 [Prosecution by information or indictment —
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purGrand jury ]
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of poses shall not be infringed, b u t nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining t h e lawful use
warrant ]
1984 (2nd S S )
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel ] Of a r m s
16 [No imprisonment for debt — Exception ]
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ]
lg
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop18 [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
erty, without due process of law
1896
contracts ]
19 [Treason defined — Proof]
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
20 [Military subordinate to t h e civil power]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail21 [Slavery forbidden ]
able except
22 [Private property for public use ]

411

(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by statute as one for which bail may be
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support
the charge and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would constitute a substantial danger to any other person or
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 9.

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.
1896
Sec. 12. [Rights of a c c u s e d persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896
[Rights of a c c u s e d persons.] [Proposed.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-

dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing
in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or
rule.
11994]
Sec. 13.

[Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
Sec. 14.

[Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of w a r r a n t ]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
1896
Sec. 15.

[Freedom of s p e e c h and of the press —
Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury t h a t the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16.

[No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 1896
Sec. 18.

[Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896

charge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium
in which the injured person is confined as a result of
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable
by the injured person, as provided in this act.
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settlement agreement, together with any payment or other
consideration received in connection with this release
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party
to whom the release or settlement agreement was
given, by the later of the following dates:
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the occurrence causing the injuries which are subject of
the settlement agreement or liability release; or
(b) within fifteen days after the date of the injured person's discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which this person has been confined
continuously since the date of the occurrence
causing the injury.
1973
78-27-33.

Statement of injured person — When
inadmissible as evidence.
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or oral, obtained from an injured
person within 15 days of an occurrence or while this
person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a
result of injuries sustained in the occurrence, and
which statement is obtained by a person whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured
person, except a law enforcement officer, shall not be
admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding
brought by or against the injured person for damages
sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless:
(1) a written verbatim copy of the statement
has been left with the injured party at the time
the statement was taken; and
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in
writing within fifteen days of the date of the
statement or within fifteen days after the date of
the injured person's initial discharge from the
hospital or sanitarium in which the person has
been confined, whichever date is later.
1992
78-27-34.

Release, settlement or statement by injured person — When rescission or disa v o w a l provisions inapplicable.
This act shall not apply in the following circumstances:
If at least five days prior to signing the settlement agreement, liability release, or statement,
the injured person has signed a statement in
writing indicating his willingness that the settlement agreement, liability release, or statement
be given or signed.
1992
78-27-35.

Release, settlement, or statement by
injured person — Notice of rescission
or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is given when it is deposited in
a mailbox, properly addressed with postage prepaid.
Notice of cancellation given by the injured person
need not take a particular form and is sufficient if it
indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement agreement, liability release, or disavowed
statement.
1973
78-27-36.

Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any rights of rescis-

sion, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing in the law.
1973
78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a
person immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of
fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including negligence in
all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or
implied warranty of a product, products liability,
and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under
Title 35, Chapter 1 or 2; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to
Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery"-means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
1994
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not
alone bar recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from
any defendant or group of defendants whose fault,
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit,
exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery prior
to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection
78-27-39(2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant under Section
78-27-39.
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable to each defendant, the fact finder may,
and when requested by a party shall, consider
the conduct of any person who contributed to the
alleged injury regardless of whether the person is
a person immune from suit or a defendant in the
action and may allocate fault to each person
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any
person immune from suit who contributed to the
alleged injury.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune
from suit is considered only to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and
a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994
78-27-39.

Separate special verdicts on total
d a m a g e s and proportion of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion
of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery,
to each defendant, and to any person immune from
suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to all persons immune from suit
is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that
percentage or proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage or proportion of fault to

J21

JUDICIAL CODE

78-27-46

78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or
the other parties in proportion to the percentage
or proportion of fault initially attributed to each
contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreeparty by the fact finder After this reallocation,
ment
1986
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the per78-27-44. Personal injury judgments — Interest
sons immune from suit being allocated no fault
authorized.
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for
fault attributed to all persons immune from suit '
personal injuries sustained by any person, resulting
is 40% or more, that percentage or proportion of
from or occasioned by the tort of any other person,
fault attributed to persons immune from suit
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by
may not be reduced under Subsection (2)(a)
negligence or willful intent of that other person, cor(c) d) The jury may not be advised of the effect
poration, association, or partnership, and whether
of any reallocation under Subsection (2)
(n) The jury may be advised that fault atthat injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise,
tributed to persons immune from suit may
the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on
reduce the award of the person seeking rethe special damages actually incurred from the date
covery
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held
action
liable, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment
jther action
1994
for plaintiff in that action, to add to the amount of
special damages actually incurred t h a t are assessed
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proporby the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, intertion of fault — No contribution.
est on that amount calculated at the legal rate, as
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date of the occuramount for which a defendant may be liable to any
rence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to
person seeking recovery is that percentage or proporthe date of entering the judgment, and to include it in
tion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or
that judgment
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actu(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from
ally incurred" does not include damages for future
any other person
medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of fu(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may
ture earning capacity
1991
not bring a civil action against any person immune
from suit to recover damages resulting from the allo78-27-45. Financial information privacy — Writcation of fault under Section 78-27-38
1994
ten consent or court order for disclosure by financial institution — Excep78-27-41. J o i n d e r of defendants.
tion — "Person" defined.
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant
(1) A person acting in behalf of the state, or any
who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defenagency, office, department, bureau, or political subdidant, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Provision of the state may not request or obtain by subcedure, any person other than a person immune from
poena or otherwise information from a state or federsuit who may have caused or contributed to the injury
ally chartered financial institution regarding the fior damage for which recovery is sought, for the purnancial transactions or other records reflecting the
pose of having determined their respective proporfinancial condition of any person without first obtaintions of fault
ing written permission from the person whose finan(2) A person immune from suit may not be named
cial transactions or other records of financial condias a defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person
tion are to be examined, or obtaining an order from a
immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately
court of competent jurisdiction permitting access to
determining the fault of the person seeking recovery
the information
and a defendant A person immune from suit is not
(2) This section does not apply to
subject to any liability, based on the allocation of
(a) reviews made by the commissioner of fifault, in this or any other action
nancial institutions to determine whether a fi(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene
nancial institution is operating in accordance
as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil
with law, or
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money
(b) reports filed as required by Section 76damages are sought
10-1906
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes
(3) As used in this section, "person" includes an
in an action may not be held liable for any fault
individual, corporation, partnership, or association
allocated to that person under Section 78-27-38

1989

1994

78-27-42.

R e l e a s e to one defendant d o e s not discharge other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one
or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides
1986
78-27-43.

Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy,
indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Title 63, Chapter
30, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title 35,
Chapter 1 Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through

78-27-46.

Financial information privacy — Notice to person about w h o m information
sought.
(1) In the event a court order is obtained pursuant
to Section 78-27-45, notice thereof shall be given to
the person about whom information is sought within
three days of the day on which service of the order is
made upon the financial institution, but no later than
seven days before the day fixed in the order as the
day upon which the records are to be produced or
examined The notice shall be accompanied by a copy
of the order which has been served upon the financial
institution and the motion or application upon which
it is based and shall be accompanied by a statement

to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and
does not include therein all defenses and objections
then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of d e f e n s e s . A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits,
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at
the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been
received.
(i) P l e a d i n g after denial of a motion. The filing
of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) S e c u r i t y for c o s t s of a nonresident plaintiff.
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded
against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor,
the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded
against such plaintiff No security shall be required
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order
dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) C o m p u l s o r y counterclaims. A pleading shall
state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state
the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced
the claim was the subject of another pending action,
or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim
by attachment or other process by which the court did
not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any
counterclaim under this Rule 13.
(b) P e r m i s s i v e c o u n t e r c l a i m . A pleading may
state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing
party's claim.
(c) C o u n t e r c l a i m e x c e e d i n g o p p o s i n g claim. A
counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the
recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim

relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from
that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after
pleading. A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a
counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires,
he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading
may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the
original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim
that the party against whom it is asserted is or may
be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a
claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties m a y b e brought in. When
the presence of parties other t h a n those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or crossclaim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction
of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. J u d g m e n t on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance
with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed *bf.
(i) Cross d e m a n d s not affected by assignment
or death. When cross demands have existed between
persons under such circumstances that, if one had
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim
could have been set up, the two demands shall be
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other,
and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by
the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted
against an assignor at the time of or before notice ol
such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent t h a t such claim, counterclaim, oi
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim
of the assignee.
(k) Claim in e x c e s s of court's jurisdiction,
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-partj
claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice'*
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such couii
does not have the power to grant the relief sough!
thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
action and certify the same and transmit all papen
therein to the district court of the county in wnicr
such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment
by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim oi
third-party claim of the fees required for certifying
the record on appeal from such court and for docket
ing the same in the district court. The fees hereir
required to be paid, shall be deposited with the cleri
of the inferior court at the time of filing such counter
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure sc
to do, the court may, upon motion of the adverse
party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, cross
claim, or third-party claim.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
i any action so certified to the district court, when
responsive pleading is required or permitted or a
ion is allowed under these rules, the time in
ch such responsive pleading or motion shall be
le shall commence to run from the time notice of
filing of the cause in the district court shall be
ed on the party making such responsive pleading
notion.
e 14. Third-party practice.
) When defendant may bring in third party.
my time after commencement of the action a delant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a sumis and complaint to be served upon a person not a
y to the action who is or may be liable to him for
)r part of the plaintiffs claim against him. The
d-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make
service if he files the third-party complaint not
r than ten days after he serveB his original anr. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon
ce to all parties to the action. The person served
1 the summons and third-party complaint, hereinr called the third-party defendant, shall make his
nses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as prod in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the
d-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other
d-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The
d-party defendant may assert against the plainmy defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to
plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may
assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out
he transaction or occurrence that is the subject
ter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party
ntiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
third-party defendant arising out of the transacor occurrence t h a t is the subject matter of the
ntiff s claim against the third-party plaintiff, and
third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his
nses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A thirdly defendant may proceed under this rule against
person not a party to the action who is or may be
le to him for all or part of the claim made in the
on against the third-party defendant.
) When plaintiff may bring in third party.
*n a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff,
nay cause a third party to be brought in under
umstances which under this rule would entitle a
ndant to do so.
e 15. A m e n d e d and supplemental pleadings.
i) Amendments. A party may amend his pleadonce as a matter of course at any time before a
>onsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
rhich no responsive pleading is permitted and the
on has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
j so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
red. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
i by leave of court or by written consent of the
erse party; and leave shall be freely given when
ice so requires. A party shall plead in response to
amended pleading within the time remaining for
>onse to the original pleading or within 10 days
r service of the amended pleading, whichever peI may be the longer, unless the court otherwise
*rs.
)) A m e n d m e n t s to conform to the evidence.
en issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
ress or implied consent of the parties, they shall
reated in all respects as if they had been raised in
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as
y be necessary to cause them to conform to the

Rule 16

evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or
defense. If the court deems it advisable t h a t the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it
shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and
m a n a g e m e n t conferences.
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court
in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct
the attorneys for tjie parties and any unrepresented
parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control
so that the case will not be protracted for lack of
management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through
more thorough preparation;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the
orderly disposition of the case.
(b) Scheduling and m a n a g e m e n t conferences.
In any action, in addition to any pretrial conferences
that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion may
direct that a scheduling or management conference
be held. The court may direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court. Scheduling or management conferences may also be held by
way of telephone conferencing between the court and
counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions
and agreements reached at scheduling and management conferences may be formally made an order of
the court. At the conference, the court may consider
the following matters:
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous
claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties or amendment of pleadings;
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery;
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions;
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of
fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authentic-
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, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand
lry in an action in which such a demand might
'e been made of right, the court in its discretion
»n motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all
les.
:) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all
ions not triable of right by a jury the court upon
tion or of its own initiative may try any issue with
advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties,
y order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the
ne effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of
ht.
lie 40. Assignment of c a s e s for trial; continuance.
a) Order and precedence. The district courts
ill provide by rule for the placing of actions upon
* trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or
upon request of a party and notice to the other
rties or (3) in such other manner as the courts may
em expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions
titled thereto by statute.
[b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a
rty, the court may in its discretion, and upon such
*ms as may be just, including the payment of costs
:asioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or
aceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is
ide upon the ground of the absence of evidence,
ch motion shall also set forth the materiality of the
idence expected to be obtained and shall show that
e diligence h a s been used to procure it. The court
ay also require the party seeking the continuance
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he
pects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
mits that such evidence would be given, and that it
ay be considered as actually given on the trial, or
fered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not
postponed upon that ground,
(c) Taking testimony of w i t n e s s e s present. If reared by the adverse party, the court shall, as a contion to such postponement, proceed to have the tesmony of any witness present taken, in the same
anner as if at the trial; and the testimony so taken
ay be read on the trial with the same effect, and
ibject to the same objections that may be made with
aspect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule
2(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)].
ule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of
any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
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defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by
the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the
court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply
to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the
claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any
court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court
may make such order for the payment of costs of the
action previously dismissed as it may deem proper
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the
plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond
or undertaking filed in support of such provisional
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to
the adverse party against whom such provisional
remedy was obtained.
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials.
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim* cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, thirdparty claims, or issues.

from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985.)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) J u d g m e n t . Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) J u d g m e n t against the state or officer or
a g e n c y thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-

ration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated o n motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose ol
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction b y o w n e r o r attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
Declaratory judgments.
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
•ocedure for obtaining a declaratory judg- eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
suant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acn accordance with these rules, and the right
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acy jury may be demanded under the circumknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
md in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
existence of another adequate remedy does judgment in the county where first docketed, with the
ude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satisis appropriate. The court may order a speedy
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of an action for a declaratory judgment and
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
ance it on the calendar.
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
them.
A. Entry.
(b) Satisfaction b y o r d e r of c o u r t . When a judgdgment u p o n the verdict of a jury. Unless
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
t otherwise directs and subject to the provirecord, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was
11 be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed,
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
is a special verdict or a general verdict acauthorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
ed by answers to interrogatories returned by
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
irsuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
ate judgment which shall be forthwith
upon the docket.
•y the clerk and filed.
(c) Entry b y clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
dgment in other c a s e s . Except as provided
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
ivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also
i with the clerk.
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, inten j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d ; n o t a t i o n in regiscluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg;tions and j u d g m e n t d o c k e t . A judgment is
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaci and shall be deemed entered for all purtion.
ccept the creation of a lien on real property,
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
e same is signed and filed as herein above
1. The clerk shall immediately make a nota- have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any
le judgment in the register of actions and the judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the
it docket.
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to
otice of s i g n i n g o r e n t r y of j u d g m e n t . The
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execurig party shall promptly give notice of the
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such
or entry of judgment to all other parties and
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of
g proof of service of such notice with the clerk
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to
ourt. However, the time for filing a notice of
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from
Is not affected by the notice requirement of
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
ivision.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other
ldgment after death of a party. If a party
c o u n t i e s . When any satisfaction of a judgment shall
*r a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact
have been entered on the judgment docket of the
ore judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
d thereon.
county where such judgment was first docketed, a
ldgment b y confession. Whenever a judgcertified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by
' confession is authorized by statute, the party the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with
the same must file with the clerk of the court
the clerk of the district court in any other county
h the judgment is to be entered a statement,
where the judgment may have been docketed. Thereby the defendant, to the following effect:
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
L) If the judgment to be confessed is for money
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall
5 or to become due, it shall concisely state the have the same effect as in the county where the same
im and that the sum confessed therefor is
was originally entered.
tly due or to become due;
R u l e 59. N e w t r i a l s ; a m e n d m e n t s of j u d g m e n t .
2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the
(a) G r o u n d s . Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
•pose of securing the plaintiff against a contina new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
it liability, it must state concisely the claim
1 that the sum confessed therefor does not ex- and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a
d the same;
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
jpecified sum.
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con:lerk shall thereupon endorse upon the stateclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
ind enter in the judgment docket, a judgment
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
court for the amount confessed, with costs of
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
if any.
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
led effective Sept. 4, 1985; J a n . 1, 1987.)
iem to pay to the other party the amount of
tiable expenses which the filing of the affida»d him to incur, including reasonable attors, and any offending party or attorney may
Ejed guilty of contempt.

